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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The American University in Cairo, Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
Using Trusted Platform Module for Securing Virtual Environment Access in Cloud 
Asser Sherif 
Supervisor: Prof. Amr El-Kadi 
Keywords: Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Machine Authentication, Virtualization 
Security, Multi-Tenancy, Malicious Insiders, Machine Identity 
 
With the increasing usage of Cloud and the Virtualization technology, there comes 
also an increasing demand to ensure the security levels of all computing environments 
and components associated and accordingly in this work we propose a new machine 
authentication mechanism using Trusted Platform Module that can be used to provide 
a secure access to virtual environments in the cloud. 
The proposed authentication module is aiming to contribute in providing a solution to 
Poor machine identity, Multi-tenancy as well as Malicious insiders known security 
problems in the cloud. It is targeting the access security to graphical user interface of 
virtual machines hosted on VirtualBox hypervisor in a Linux based environment 
through authenticating clients trying to connect using the client’s Trusted Platform 
Module Public Endorsement key as a pre-authorized signature to the virtual 
environment in addition to the normal user name and password authentication of the 
connecting user. 
Results obtained from the output of this work indicates that it is possible to 
authenticate the machines based on their Trusted Platform Module signatures and 
provide them access to VirtualBox environment only based on a pre-defined Access 
Control List with minimal one time overhead upon establishing the initial connection. 
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1 BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we provide a background review on Cloud computing as well as 
Virtualization Technology with an overview on the security challenges related to the 
focus of this work.  
We also provide an overview on the Trusted Platform Module and its components in 
addition to some related research activities conducted using TPM. We conclude this 
chapter with a review on the future directions of using TPM. 
1.1 CLOUD COMPUTING 
The term “Cloud Computing” has been used widely since 2008 to define a technology 
where users can access infrastructure and applications hosted remotely on network-
enabled servers viewed as a pool of shared resources having the following 
characteristics [3],[4]-[6]: 
 Multi-tenancy: based on the model of shared resources, computing environments 
are no longer dedicated to a single user but are shared across multiple users and 
sometimes organizations to provide access to offered services 
 Elasticity: where the users can control the computing resources being used and 
increase or decrease them based on the current need 
 Scalability: where cloud service providers have the ability to scale up their 
offered resources to a much higher level than what organizations can offer on a 
locally hosted data centers 
 On-Demand resources provisioning: where users have the capability of self-
provisioning their computing resources needs, resources are monitored and 
controlled to ensure optimization 
 Pay as you go: where users or organizations will only pay for the actual resources 
utilization on the time they are used for, this is performed using the cloud 
metering capabilities for each offered service 
Virtualization technology is a key driver for cloud computing as it provides the ability 
to pool resources and easily administer and monitor their utilization. We will be 
discussing this in more details in section 2.2.  
1.1.1 Cloud Computing Service Models 
Cloud Computing consists of three main service models upon which the offered cloud 
service depends. The services offered at a higher level depend on the services offered 
on the underlying levels of this service model [3]-[5]. 
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Figure (1) illustrates the main three service models of the cloud-computing 
environment [7]. 
 
Figure 1 Cloud Computing Service Models 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
The underlying layer of the cloud computing service model where cloud service 
providers provide processing, storage, memory as well as networking resources to 
users and is mostly in a virtualized environment. 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
The middle layer of the cloud computing service model where cloud service providers 
provide users (mostly developers) with the required platforms to be capable of 
deploying and managing applications using programming languages or tools that are 
offered in the cloud without in depth knowledge of the underlying infrastructure 
environment. 
 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
The upper layer of the cloud computing service model where cloud service providers 
provide users with the capability of executing applications without any knowledge of 
the development platforms or the infrastructure environment being used to host these 
applications. User can access this layer from any cloud client (Mobile devices, 
Browsers, Thin Clients or Terminal emulators). 
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1.1.2 Cloud Computing Deployment Models 
Cloud computing has several Deployment Models [3]-[5], as illustrated in Figure (2) 
[7]: 
 
 
Figure 2 Cloud Computing Deployment Models 
 Public Cloud 
Cloud service providers offer cloud resources for public use servicing multiple 
tenants. The services are offered free of charge or using a payment model which is 
usually based on pay as you go calculations. The cloud resources are hosted in data 
centers that are owned and managed by the cloud service providers and are accessed 
over the internet and accordingly requires special security considerations. 
 Private Cloud 
Cloud resources that are accessed only by a single organization servicing multiple 
business units for this organization. The computing environment is usually hosted 
internally inside this organization’s premises or sometimes externally at a service 
provider data center with a dedicated, secured communication channel only for the 
hosted organization. It can be managed either internally or using a third party. 
 Hybrid Cloud 
The formation of a cloud computing environment by combining two or more distinct 
clouds from any deployment model (Public or Private). This offers more flexibility in 
terms of scalability for organizations as they can expand their computing resources – 
even on temporary basis if needed - beyond their private owned cloud by gaining 
access to a public cloud environment. 
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 Community Cloud 
Cloud resources that are accessed by multiple organizations that share a common 
interest or together are forming a community serving a particular concern. The 
computing environment is hosted internally in one or more of these organizations or 
externally at a service provider data center and it can be managed either internally 
from within the community or using a third party. 
1.2 VIRTUALIZATION TECHNOLOGY  
Virtualization technology is a key driver for Cloud computing where it depends on 
de-coupling the computing resources from the applications running on top of them 
including the operating systems. This concept allows for the creation of multiple 
virtual machines on a single physical machine and benefiting from a pooled resources 
model to ensure efficient utilization [5]. 
Virtualization is also a key enabler for multi-tenancy in the cloud; it provides the 
capability of hosting multiple computing environments for several organizations on 
shared computing resources. It also provides organizations with a possibility of data 
centers consolidation for a better utilization of existing resources as well as cost 
saving opportunities in the future [5], [8]. 
There are different types of Virtualization models (Hardware, Software, Memory, 
Storage and Network). In the scope of this work, we will be focusing on Hardware 
Virtualization where “Host” is used to refer to the physical machine providing the 
resources to create virtual machines while “Guest” would be used to refer to the 
virtual machine running on top of the physical host machine. “Hypervisor” or 
“Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)” is software that is used to create and manage 
virtual machines on the physical host [7], [8]. 
There are different levels of Hardware Virtualization as follows [7], [9]: 
 Full Virtualization: A complete emulation of all the host hardware is available to 
each guest machine 
 Partial Virtualization: Some of the host hardware is provided to the guest 
machines through emulation but not everything, accordingly some of the guest 
programs will need to be modified to run in this model 
 Paravirtualization: Minimal hardware emulation, multiple guest machines can 
run at the same time on the host hardware in isolated domains but it requires 
modification of the guest operating systems to work efficiently with the 
Hypervisor 
In addition, as illustrated in Figure (3), there are different types of Hypervisors [9]: 
5 
 
 Type 1 (or native, bare metal): Hypervisors will run directly on the host machine 
hardware to manage the guest machines and control the access to the host 
hardware resources 
 Type 2 (or hosted): Hypervisors will run from within an operating system 
environment on the host machine as a second software level. The guest operating 
systems in this case will run at a third level above the hardware 
 
Figure 3 Hypervisor Types 
1.3 IN-SCOPE SECURITY CHALLENGES 
As with the case of traditional IT environments, cloud computing and virtualization 
technology usage also have their share of security issues and threats that change over 
time with the adoption of new technologies. The cloud and virtualization security is a 
very broad topic with many research studies conducted to cover each aspect of it. In 
this section, we will provide an overview on the security challenges related to the 
scope of this work. 
1.3.1 Identity Management  
Identity Management in cloud computing is an attempt to clearly answer the question 
of who is really using and offering the provided service. This spans several levels 
starting from the user id, the connected client devices and the service provider as well 
as any in between attributes and transactions to ensure the complete solution integrity 
[10]. 
Identity management from a user perspective – sometimes referenced as Identity 
Access Management - is a widely researched topic with focus on the digital identity 
of the user. It is mainly targeting how to authenticate and authorize the users before 
they access any service according to their defined roles or privileges.  
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Our focus in this work would be focusing on the identity of the client machines used 
by end users to access a virtual environment in the cloud. This will be associated with 
the normal user authentication processes to establish a user – machine complete 
authentication mechanism before the access to a virtual machine is established. 
1.3.2 Multi-tenancy  
CSA1 defined Multi-tenancy as follows: 
“Multi-tenancy in its simplest form implies use of same resources or application by 
multiple consumers that may belong to same organization or different organization. 
The impact of multi-tenancy is visibility of residual data or trace of operations by 
other user or tenant. Multi-tenancy in cloud service models implies a need for policy-
driven enforcement, segmentation, isolation, governance, service levels, and 
chargeback/billing models for different consumer constituencies. Consumers may 
choose to utilize a public cloud providers’ service offering on an individual user basis 
or, in the instance of private cloud hosting, an organization may segment users as 
different business units sharing a common infrastructure.” 
Multi-tenancy is mainly depending on Virtualization technology to enable the sharing 
of computing resources and at the same time ensures proper utilization. Multi-tenancy 
can be achieved at different levels of the cloud service models, IaaS, PaaS or SaaS 
[9]. 
 
Figure 4 Multi-tenancy in Cloud 
Figure (4) above illustrates the Multi-Tenancy concept in Private and Public cloud 
delivery models [6]. 
 
                                                          
 
1 https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/csaguide.v3.0.pdf 
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Our focus in this work will be on the Multi-tenancy in the IaaS model and the security 
related to the Virtualization environment since the co-existence of multiple tenants on 
the same physical servers requires strong security policies to ensure complete 
isolation and to protect against attacks. 
The Cloud Security Alliance Group listed the Multi-Tenancy security threat being 
part of the shared technology vulnerabilities as number nine in the Top Nine Cloud 
Computing Threats in 2013 [11]. 
1.3.3 Malicious Insiders 
The definition of Malicious Insiders as defined by CERT2 is as follows: 
“A malicious insider threat to an organization is a current or former employee, 
contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an 
organization's network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that 
access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organization's information or information systems.” 
The threat of an insider using privileged access rights to perform un-authorized 
operations applies in the cloud environment and specifically in the IaaS service model 
where system administrators of a cloud service provider can have access to 
infrastructure as well as data storage and can compromise the security level if no 
proper security policies are implemented [11].  
The Cloud Security Alliance Group listed the Malicious Insiders threat as number six 
in the Top Nine Cloud Computing Threats in 2013 [11].  
1.4 TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE  
“Trusted Platform Module” refers to a specification and its implementation as an 
embedded cryptographic device which has been designed by the TPM Work Group, a 
part of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [12], [13].   
TPM includes the following capabilities [14]-[15]: 
 Storing of digital credentials such as passwords in a hardware-based vault 
 Augmenting smart cards, fingerprint readers and fobs for multi-factor 
authentication 
 Encrypting files and folders to control access 
 Establishing state information to enable endpoint integrity 
                                                          
 
2 http://www.cert.org/insider-threat/index.cfm 
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 Hash state information prior to hard driven shutdown for endpoint integrity 
 Enabling more secure VPN, remote and wireless access 
 Can be used in conjunction with Full Disk Encryption to restrict access to 
sensitive data 
 Can be used for machine authentication and hardware encryption 
 Can be used for signing, secure key storage and attestation 
We can use TPM to provide low-volume public key cryptographic services to a 
machine using a private key stored on the TPM chip itself and to store credentials 
only to be used when the system is in some specific configuration. Using the TPM in 
addition to a trusted system BIOS, computers that are TPM enabled can boot into a 
trusted operating system and can verify the configuration of software that they are 
running to third parties [12]. Encryption and signing are well-known techniques but 
TPM can make them  stronger by providing the capability of storing the keys in 
protected hardware storage [14].  
One key capability that TPM provides to enable trusted computing is that it can 
securely store a series of measurements through a set of registers called Platform 
Configuration Registers (PCRs). A computer with an enabled TPM and trusted BIOS 
can boot up, take a series of measurements of the hardware and software on this 
computer and store them in the PCRs. The TPM can then cryptographically sign these 
PCR measurements and send them to a remote party to verify that the platform with 
that TPM has been booted up and measured correctly. TPM can also use these PCRs 
to bind keys to a platform in a specific state so that it may not be allowed to have 
access to the key if it is in a different state than it was when the key was created [12]. 
TPM can also be used for Full-Disk Encryption to protect Data using an early 
authentication mechanism before the OS is loaded [16]. A common implementation 
of this Encryption capability is used in Microsoft Windows BitLocker [17].  
TPM is also used for “Remote Attestation” where third parties can authenticate a 
machine with enabled TPM remotely through the use of certificates, accordingly the 
authenticated machine can then be granted access to a cloud service [12]. 
An important authentication challenge with TPM is that an attacker who knows a 
legitimate user’s password but does not have his physical machine will not be able to 
use the user account to access the resources he is permitted to access [16].  
One limitation of TPM usage in protection is that it only provides a guarantee at 
software load time. Accordingly, if a legitimate application is loaded and then is 
modified in memory, the TPM will not be aware of this change. The TPM does not 
protect against any attacks that can use flaws in currently running software programs 
[18]. 
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Various vendors manufacture these TPM chips and they are indented to be cheap 
devices that can be included on motherboards to enable trusted computing. The 
requirement of keeping the TPM cheap led to low requirements for hardware security, 
which entails that it might not cover all possible attacks against it [12]. 
1.4.1 TPM Components  
 
Figure 5 TPM Components  
 As illustrated in Figure (5) above, a TPM chip contains multiple components listed in 
details below [5], [13], [20]. 
 Cryptographic Processor 
Has an RSA key generator used to create RSA key pairs, a random number generator, 
an encryption-decryption engine that provides the necessary functions for encryption 
and decryption of data on disks or signing PCR values. It also contains a Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA-1) used for hashing values that are stored in the PCR. 
 Persistent Memory (Non-volatile Memory (NV)) 
Since there is a need to preserve certain values even when the TPM has no power, 
data stored in the persistent memory will stay unchanged when there is no power on 
the TPM chip.  
The Endorsement Key (EK) is a pair of RSA keys that is installed when the TPM is 
manufactured. The public EK value is used to uniquely identify a TPM chip and will 
not change during the TPM chip lifetime.  
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The Storage Root Key (SRK) is also a pair of RSA keys that is used to encrypt other 
keys stored outside the TPM. SRK is the Root of Trust for Storage and can be 
changed when a new user takes ownership of the TPM chip on the system. 
 Versatile Memory (Volatile Memory) 
In contrast to persistent memory, data in the Volatile Memory will be lost (reset) 
when there is no power or when the computer reboots. Persistent memory limits the 
number of write accesses, but with versatile memory there is an unlimited number of 
writes allowed. 
Versatile memory contains two main components: 
o Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) 
There are at least 16 PCRs in a TPM chip to store platform configuration 
measurements. These measurements are normally hashed values (SHA-1) of 
applications running on a platform. PCR does not allow direct write access however 
data is stored on them using a process called extending the PCR. 
o Attestation Identity Keys (AIK) 
To ensure that you are establishing a communication to a valid TPM enabled 
platform, remote attestation is performed using Endorsement Keys. Some arguments 
were made that this would uncover the privacy of the TPM owner due to the unique 
nature of the EK and therefore the commonly used method for remote attestation is 
done using AIK instead. We will be discussing in more details this argument within 
the scope of this work. 
To summarize, Table (1) below presents the different keys that TPM uses along with 
their description: 
Table 1 TPM Keys 
TPM Key Description 
Endorsement Key (EK) 
Unique RSA key pair installed during 
manufacturing and cannot be changed 
during the TPM lifetime 
Storage Root Key (SRK) 
RSA key pair used to encrypt other keys 
stored outside TPM, can be changed 
when TPM ownership is changed 
Attestation Identity Keys (AIK) 
Key pair created by TPM to be used for 
platform attestation instead of EK to 
protect privacy of the TPM client 
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1.5 TPM RELATED RESEARCH 
In this section, we provide an overview on some of the researches that were 
conducted in relation to using TPM in access security.  
1.5.1 C-MAS: The Cloud Mutual Authentication Scheme 
In [21], a scheme is proposed to solve the problem of authentication between users 
and a cloud environment based on Trusted Computing Technology by the use of 
smart cards.  The proposed mechanism establishes the authentication of both users 
and the cloud server provider, generates the session key and verifies the credibility of 
the platform of the cloud service provider. 
As illustrated in Figure (6) below, the User, the TPM enabled cloud server the 
Certificate Authority can access each other over the internet. The user first register on 
the cloud server platform then uses his smart card to access the cloud server through 
his client once a valid attestation is performed using the certificate authority.  
The certificate authority role is to manage the TPM public key of the cloud server that 
indicates its identity. The user, after being identified using his smart card 
communicate with the certificate authority and test the authenticity of the cloud 
service provider using the TPM public key [21]. 
 
 
Figure 6 Cloud Mutual Authentication Scheme 
This mechanism is used to verify the identity and integrity of the platform of the 
cloud service provider itself, but not the identity of the connected clients. 
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1.5.2 Enabling Trusted Distributed Control with Remote Attestation 
In [20], TPM is used to measure the integrity of a system before it joins a network by 
building a trusted software stack that can be verified by a remote machine (Certificate 
Authority). This integrity check will allow a network to validate that a computer is 
booted with an uncorrupted software stack by measuring the PCR values in the TPM 
at boot time.  
This feature is used to build an extension to the 802.1X network access control 
protocol and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) that allows making 
authorization decisions based on the booted software stack of the computer instead of 
a key or a password based technique.  
This implementation was done using Xen Hypervisor, Ubuntu 9.04 and a modified 
version of the Linux Grub Boot loader.  
1.5.3 The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and Sealed Storage 
In [18], a model was presented that can provide a mechanism for creating sealed 
storage that can only be accessed by designated applications whenever needed. This 
mechanism is almost similar to the secure boot based on the last known good values 
of the TPM PCR’s but this time it is used to seal and un-seal a storage device to 
ensure it is only being accessed if it is in a safe state. 
This model depends on the fact that TPM provides a way to enable the correlation 
between data and the current platform configuration presented by the PCR values. 
Two commands were introduced to Seal and Unseal a storage as follows [18]: 
 Seal Command: 
The Seal command will use a set of TPM PCR indices as input and encrypts the data 
provided using its Storage Root Key.  
The output of the Seal command would be a cipher text in addition to a list of indices 
that are integrity-protected as well as the corresponding values of the PCR’s at the 
time of issuing the Seal command. 
The Seal command is also providing the possibility of associating the values of the 
PCR’s that must exist before Unseal decrypts the data during the encryption time. 
 Unseal Command: 
The Unseal command will use the cipher text and the PCR indices created by the Seal 
command to verify the integrity of the corresponding PCR values and compare them 
against the current values of the PCR’s. 
Based on the output of the comparison, the TPM can decrypt the storage and return 
the output data required. 
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1.6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR USING TPM 
As discussed in earlier sections, the increasing usage of cloud technology requires an 
increased security measures as well to ensure a complete secure solution for end users 
and organizations. TCG3 researches and other security vendors’ commercial products 
will be providing an aid to secure the cloud more and more in the future. TPM in 
particular is playing an important role now in several security products to ensure this 
ultimate secure solution exists [14]. 
The overall secured solution starts from the ability of the TPM to check on the 
installed software of each cloud-based server and ensuring the integrity of the loaded 
software stack. Accordingly associating the output with something like TNC4 to 
control the network access will provide the ability to restrict access to a network or a 
service [14].  
In addition, we can also use TPM for self-encrypting of hard disk drives (BitLocker is 
an example of software that is starting to be widely used now by organizations to 
encrypt hard drives especially of employees laptops).  
Another direction is Windows 8 operating system, Microsoft will be requiring having 
the TPM chip on all Windows PCs, phones and tablets. This will be moving the 
security checks to the platform’s lowest level. There are future hopes and 
expectations from security experts that this will help to develop better security 
mechanisms that are based on TPM to prevent against the current boot-level 
intrusions faced. [22] 
In addition to Microsoft, Google Chromebook is already including a TPM chip and is 
using it in measuring the firmware once the device is powered up. It determines if the 
firmware is changed since the last shutdown and if it did, it removes the faulty 
firmware and replaces it from a library of known good configurations.  It then checks 
the firmware again and if it is ok, it continues to boot up. This is simply providing a 
self-healing capability that TCG is hoping can be extended to other vendors [22]. 
It is worth nothing, even though there is an increasing usage of TPM enabled devices 
for better security levels and data protection mechanisms, there are still some 
countries that do not allow the use of TPM for security purposes. The list of countries 
includes Russia, China & Morocco5 [23]. 
                                                          
 
3 http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/ 
 
4 http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/solutions/network_access_and_identity 
 
5 Based on personal work experience 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
2.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
To contribute in providing a solution for three Cloud Security problems, with a 
specific focus on the access security for Virtual environments. 
The three problems within scope are: 
 Poor Machine Identity 
An attempt to answer the question of “Who is really using the cloud service?” This is 
targeting the identification of hardware clients trying to connect to cloud services and 
ensuring they are legitimate clients that are granted the correct access permissions to 
this cloud service [1].  
 Multi-Tenancy 
A standard security requirement from any cloud service provider that shared virtual 
resources that are accessed by users from different trusted organizations needs to be 
always isolated for each organization’s users at different levels during provisioning, 
runtime, migration and de-provisioning [2]. 
 Malicious Insiders  
A security problem where threats to an organization can be from Privileged insiders 
such as employees who change role but keep privileges or ex-employees whose 
access were not revoked after contract termination [2], our focus in this work would 
be on the client-side malicious insiders.  
2.2 OBJECTIVE & MOTIVATION 
The objective of this work is to Design, Implement and Verify a machine 
authentication and authorization mechanism using Trusted Platform Module for 
accessing remote Virtual Resources (Machines) in a Cloud Service. This mechanism 
will be used to identify the access privilege of a client machine in association with the 
normal user authentication and authorization mechanisms. 
The Motivation behind this is the increasing usage of Cloud Services and 
Virtualization Technology by many organizations and accordingly the need to ensure 
a secure environment access. In addition, although Security is one of the most 
researched topics, client security in terms of authentication of Hardware machines is 
not a very popular one even though it can provide solutions to many security 
problems like the ones mentioned in the Problem Statement Section. 
In addition, the use of Trusted Platform Module is increasing across several 
organizations and governments and is becoming a requirement for several software 
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providers to have a TPM chip to ensure hardware level security; we will be discussing 
this in more details in section 2.6 where we review the future directions in using 
TPM. 
The output of this work should be able to provide the following benefits: 
 Allow the restriction of virtual machines remote desktop access to specific 
physical client machines so it can contribute to the Multi-tenancy problem 
resolution. 
 Guarantee for an organization that its cloud based virtual environment is only 
accessed through approved physical clients list so it will also contribute to the 
client-side malicious insiders problem by preventing the use of privileged 
accounts except from within an approved and monitored physical machines. 
 In addition, it will be easy to identify the physical clients accessing a specific 
virtual machine at any given time and in case of threats, it will be possible to take 
corrective actions with those clients. 
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3 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In this chapter, we present the high-level Design, the Architecture and the Process 
Flow of the developed mechanism. 
3.1 HIGH LEVEL DESIGN 
The proposed solution must provide a mechanism to allow the identification of the 
client machines to the Hypervisor; in addition, it must also provide an authentication 
mechanism using the client machine’s unique identifier along with the normal user 
authentication process. Furthermore, it should be able to identify the access rights of 
each client machine to allow or deny the access to virtual machines accordingly. 
The solution is developed based on TPM Endorsement Keys being unique to each 
hardware platform and thus can be used to clearly identify a client machine. 
The high-level design of the proposed mechanism is as follows: 
 ACL database associated with the Hypervisor to add, remove and modify the 
hosted virtual machines and map them to the list of allowed TPM-enabled 
physical clients that are allowed to connect to their graphical user interface 
remotely 
 ACL database administration module to add, remove or modify the TPM 
Endorsement keys of client machines allowed to access the remote desktop of 
virtual machines hosted on the Hypervisor 
 Client machines authentication module using the client machine’s TPM Key 
signature which in association with the normal user based authentication is able to 
either grant or deny access to the remote desktop of the  virtual machines hosted 
on the Hypervisor  
3.2 ARCHITECTURE 
As illustrated in Figure (7) below, the architecture of the developed mechanism 
comprises several components: 
 Linux Hosts 
All physical machines are Linux Based running Ubuntu 12.04.4 LTS, used either as a 
Host for VirtualBox Hypervisor or as Client machines 
 TPM 
TPM chips used are version 1.2, Spec Level 2 and running on Dell Laptops of Models 
Latitude D630  and Precision M4500 both manufactured by Broadcom 
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 rDesktop 
rDesktop version 1.7.1 is used for establishing RDP connections to virtual machines 
hosted on the VirtualBox Hypervisor 
 VirtualBox 
VirtualBox version 4.3.8 for Linux Hosts is used as the Hypervisor for hosting VM’s. 
VirtualBox 4.3.10 Oracle VM VirtualBox Extension Pack is installed as well to 
provide the additional functionality of VRDP [8]. 
 
 
Figure 7 Architecture Overview 
 
 SQLite 
SQLite version 3.8.3 is used to host the ACL that is accessed from VirtualBox 
Hypervisor, physical clients and the Authentication Module. This Database can be 
hosted locally on the same physical host as the VirtualBox Hypervisor or can be on 
any external network storage as long as the path is accessible from all required 
components 
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 User Accounts 
Users will need to have either access to the Physical machine hosting the VirtualBox 
Hypervisor through local or Domain accounts or access through local accounts to the 
destination VM directly, depending on the VirtualBox user authentication library to 
be used 
In addition, each client machine owner will need to have his client TPM owner 
password to be used while establishing the RDP connection to the destination VM on 
VirtualBox.  
3.3 PROCESS FLOW 
In Figure (8), we provide a complete explanation of the mechanism process flow. As 
illustrated, the process starts with an initiation of an rDesktop connection from a user 
on a client machine to a VirtualBox Server to access the remote desktop display of a 
VM. This rDesktop request contains the following fields: 
Table 2 rDesktop Connection Request Fields 
Field Name Description Standard / TPM Related 
User Name This is required to authenticate the 
access for the remote connection 
request, either to the VirtualBox 
Server or to the Destination VM. 
(Depending on the VirtualBox User 
Authentication Library used) 
This is different from the Login User 
Name on the Destination VM once 
the remote Display connection is 
established 
Standard Field 
Password For the user account used for the 
remote connection authentication 
Standard Field 
Client Machine 
TPM Public 
Endorsement Key 
The new TPM authentication 
mechanism generates this key during 
the execution of the rDesktop 
connection request and sends it to the 
destination VirtualBox Server.  
The initiating user will be prompted 
to provide the TPM Owner Password 
to be able to generate this EK 
TPM Related Field. 
 
This is a non-standard 
field for rDesktop and 
is used  specifically for 
this new TPM 
authentication 
mechanism 
Destination 
VirtualBox Server 
Name or IP address 
To specify the destination server 
receiving the remote connection 
request 
Standard Field 
Destination VM 
Remote Desktop 
Server Port number 
This is a unique port number assigned 
by VirtualBox for each VM that has 
VRDP enabled (can be modified as 
needed per VM) 
Standard Field 
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Figure 8 TPM Authentication Process Flow 
The request is then received by the VirtualBox Server, which maps the received 
Remote Desktop Server Port to a UUID representing the Destination VM and passes 
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it on to the TPM Machine Authentication process. The client TPM public EK is also 
received by the VirtualBox server as part of this step. 
In parallel, there is an ongoing process running all the time to create and update the 
ACL for the VM’s hosted on the VirtualBox server. This process starts with the 
creation of the first VM on VirtualBox server, which triggers the creation of a SQLite 
Database that will be used for the ACL going forward. This Database is populated 
from VirtualBox upon the creation of any new VM or cloning of an existing VM with 
the following details: 
 VM Name 
 VM UUID 
The VM Name is required to be present in the ACL prior to the addition of any client 
machines as the clients addition must be against an already existing VM Name. 
VirtualBox must also add the VM UUID in the ACL as this UUID is used to identify 
the destination VM upon receiving the rDesktop remote connection request from a 
client and accordingly used to check the ACL for client entry against this VM UUID. 
The ACL is also updated by VirtualBox when a VM is deleted to remove the 
corresponding entries in the Database. 
In addition, an ACL Administration Module is used to update the Database with 
Clients information and map the access permissions to VM’s, the details provided to 
the ACL through this Administration module are: 
 Client Name 
 Client TPM Public Endorsement Key 
 VM Name to be accessed by this Client 
This ACL administration module should only be accessed by the System 
Administrator responsible for VirtualBox as it is the single point of entry to add and 
update clients, their corresponding Public Endorsement Keys and the VirtualBox 
VM’s access list.   
Having all this information about clients and VM’s available in the ACL, the TPM 
Machine Authentication process then uses the UUID of the destination VM to check 
if the client trying to connect is listed in the ACL of this destination VM. If found, it 
will then compare the TPM public EK received along with the connection request 
with the one already existing in the ACL Database for this client machine and 
accordingly either deny the connection request or pass it on to the next level and start 
the User authentication process. 
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The User authentication process can be performed in one of two approaches 
supported by VirtualBox depending on the authentication module library used; both 
approaches will be discussed in more details in section 4.2: 
 VBoxAuth (Linux PAM): User Authentication is done against the VirtualBox 
Server Host’s Linux PAM system 
 VBoxAuthSimple: User Authentication based on User Accounts and Passwords 
added to the extra data section of the settings file of each VM 
Whether the Linux PAM or the VM extra data settings file approach are used for 
authenticating users, the user is either granted or denied access to the Remote 
Desktop of the destination VM and the process completes. 
Figure (9) illustrates the sequence diagram for the use-case scenario starting from 
requesting a Virtual Machine to be created, requesting the TPM EK of a client 
machine to be added to the ACL then finally initiating the rDesktop remote 
connection to the VM and the associated machine TPM authentication followed by 
the user authentication. 
 
Figure 9 TPM Authentication Sequence Diagram 
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4 IMPLEMENTATION 
In this chapter, we present the details of the implementation of the new TPM 
authentication mechanism, starting from the prerequisites and the environment setup 
to the technical details of how this new mechanism was developed and deployed. 
4.1 PREREQUISITES 
4.1.1 Server 
The server used to host the Hypervisor is Linux based with Ubuntu Desktop 12.04 
LTS "Precise Pangolin" 64-bit [24] as the operating system. We used VirtualBox 
4.3.8 [25] for Ubuntu 12.04 to provide the Hypervisor functionality. In addition, we 
installed OpenSSH [26] to allow for SCP between the clients and the server. 
The Database used to host the ACL contents is SQLite 3.8.4.3 [27]. 
4.1.2 Clients 
All clients are Linux based with Ubuntu Desktop 12.04 LTS "Precise Pangolin" 64-
bit [24] as the operating system. All clients must have a TPM chip with specification 
level 2 revision 1.2 [28]. 
To establish the remote Desktop connection from the client machines to the 
Hypervisor server, we used rDesktop 1.7.1 [29]. 
4.1.3 Accounts 
For the system administrator to be able to setup the required environment including 
the Hypervisor on the server machine, an account with ROOT privilege is required.  
On the clients’ side, user accounts on client machines for normal login to the 
Operating system are required.  
If VBoxAuth (Linux PAM) VirtualBox user authentication is used, user accounts on 
the server machine that the clients use to authenticate the connection to VirtualBox 
virtual machines are needed.  
In case VirtualBox VBoxAuthSimple user authentication is used, user accounts in the 
individual VM’s XML settings file are needed. 
Users attempting to establish a connection to the Hypervisor use these user accounts 
to transfer the TPM Public EK through SCP in both methods, VBoxAuth (Linux 
PAM) or VBoxAuthSimple. 
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4.2 ENVIRONMENT SETUP 
This section details the setup procedure required for the different solution 
components illustrated in Figure (7) in section 3.2. 
4.2.1 VirtualBox 4.3.8 
Since we need to modify the source code of VirtualBox to integrate the new TPM 
authentication module, the .deb Linux package is not used and instead we built 
VirtualBox from the source code directly using the following instructions [30]. 
To install the required prerequisites packages and additional packages: 
>sudo apt-get install gcc g++ bcc iasl xsltproc uuid-dev\ 
zlib1g-dev libidl-dev libsdl1.2-dev libxcursor-dev\ 
libasound2-dev libstdc++5 libhal-dev libpulse-dev\ 
libxml2-dev libxslt1-dev python-dev libqt4-dev\ 
qt4-dev-tools libcap-dev libxmu-dev mesa-common-dev\ 
libglu1-mesa-dev linux-kernel-headers\ 
libcurl4-openssl-dev libpam0g-dev libxrandr-dev\ 
libxinerama-dev libqt4-opengl-dev makeself\  
libdevmapper-dev default-jdk python-central\ 
texlive-latex-base texlive-latex-extra\  
texlive-latex-recommended texlive-fonts-extra\  
texlive-fonts-recommended 
 
>sudo apt-get install ia32-libs libc6-dev-i386 lib32gcc1\  
gcc-multilib lib32stdc++6 g++-multilib 
 
Since we are building on a 64-bit system, there is a need to create some missing links 
to shared 32-bit libraries: 
>ln -s libX11.so.6    /usr/lib32/libX11.so  
>ln -s libXTrap.so.6  /usr/lib32/libXTrap.so  
>ln -s libXt.so.6     /usr/lib32/libXt.so  
>ln -s libXtst.so.6   /usr/lib32/libXtst.so 
>ln -s libXmu.so.6    /usr/lib32/libXmu.so 
>ln -s libXext.so.6   /usr/lib32/libXext.so 
 
To start the build, we execute the following commands: 
>cd source_code_root_dir 
>./configure --disable-hardening 
>source ./env.sh 
>kmk all 
>cd out/linux.amd64/release/bin/src/ 
>make 
>sudo make install 
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The next two commands load VirtualBox module into the kernel and grant 
permissions to access it. This must execute before using one of the VirtualBox 
frontends:  
>sudo modprobe vboxdrv 
>sudo chmod 777 /dev/vboxdrv 
 
The GUI frontend used is “VirtualBox” and invokes as follows: 
>cd source_code_root_dir/out/linux.amd64/release/bin/ 
>./VirtualBox 
 
Another VirtualBox frontend that invokes from the same path is “VBoxHeadless” 
[31] that does not depend on the X window system of the host, has no graphical user 
interface, and used to manage virtual machines that is only accessed through VRDP 
[32]. 
To make use of the functionality of VRDP, we must download and install VirtualBox 
extension pack [33] using the “VirtualBox” GUI frontend or using “VBoxManage” 
command [34]. “VBoxManage” invokes from the same path as “VirtualBox” and 
“VBoxHeadless”: 
>VBoxManage extpack install Path_To_Extension_Pack 
 
VirtualBox is now ready to setup virtual machines as needed with any operating 
systems supported; the following must be taken into consideration on the individual 
virtual machine level to be able to use the new TPM authentication mechanism: 
4.2.1.1 Remote Display  
4.2.1.1.1 VRDP Server 
With the installation of the VirtualBox extension pack, the functionality of VRDP is 
now supported however, it is not enabled by default on each virtual machine except if 
“VBoxHeadless” is used, as there are no other means to access the VM except 
through remote display. Accordingly, to use the GUI frontend the VRDP server must 
be enabled on the individual virtual machine level either using the Display settings 
from the “VirtualBox” GUI frontend or using the “VBoxManage” command [32]: 
>VBoxManage modifyvm "VM_Name" --vrde on 
 
In addition to enabling the VRDP server, each VM requires a unique TCP port to use 
for listening to incoming remote connection requests. The default port is TCP 3389 
that cannot be used for more than one VM. The port must be assigned per VM either 
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using the Display settings from the “VirtualBox” GUI frontend or using the 
“VBoxManage” command [32]: 
>VBoxManage modifyvm "VM_Name" --vrdeport TCP_Port# 
 
4.2.1.1.2 RDP Authentication 
To control the access to virtual machines through RDP, VirtualBox provides three 
different RDP user authentication methods that we can configure per VM as needed 
[35]. 
 Null Authentication: 
No authentication required, any user can connect through RDP to the VM 
 Guest Authentication: 
Authentication done against Guest accounts, this feature is not yet supported and still 
being tested by VirtualBox 
 External Authentication: 
VirtualBox uses External authentication libraries to perform user authentication, it 
comes with two built-in libraries as follows: 
o VBoxAuth 
The default external user authentication library used by VirtualBox, it authenticates 
against the user credentials on the host system where VirtualBox is running. The user 
account does not have to match that on the destination VM. 
On Linux Hosts, VBoxAuth.so uses the host’s PAM system to authenticate the users 
requesting RDP connections to a destination VM on VirtualBox.  
On Ubuntu systems specifically, we need to configure the VirtualBox PAM 
authentication first before using the VBoxAuth.so library to allow it to access the host 
PAM services, using the below steps [36]: 
i. Create a new PAM Service instead of the default “login” PAM service used 
by VirtualBox. For this, we create and edit a new PAM configuration file 
“vrdpauth”: 
>sudo gedit /etc/pam.d/vrdpauth 
 
ii. Add the below lines to the new “vrdpauth” PAM configuration file: 
auth            required        pam_unix.so 
account         required        pam_unix.so broken_shadow 
26 
 
iii. Set the value of the environment variable “VOBX_AUTH_PAM_SERVICE” 
to the new “vrdpauth” PAM services so that VBoxAuth.so uses it instead of 
the default /etc/pam.d/login service: 
>export VBOX_AUTH_PAM_SERVICE="vrdpauth" 
 
o VBoxAuthSimple 
Additional library that provides user authentication against user accounts configured 
per VM in the “extradata” fields in each VM XML settings file. 
Since this is not the default VirtualBox library for RDP external authentication, it has 
to be globally set manually for VirtualBox when needed as follows [37]: 
>VBoxManage setproperty vrdeauthlibrary "VBoxAuthSimple" 
 
Each VM where this external RDP authentication mechanism is required will need to 
first switch to external authentication then to configure user accounts in its XML 
settings file as follows [37]: 
i. Configure the VM to use external RDP authentication, using the library 
already set by VirtualBox: 
>VBoxManage modifyvm “VM_NAME” --vrdeauthtype external 
 
ii. Use VirtualBox internal hashing mechanism to hash the password for the user 
who will be added to the XML settings file of the VM: 
>VBoxManage internalcommands passwordhash "PASSWORD TO \ 
BE HASHED" 
 
Password hash: XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
iii. Add the user name and hashed password to the “extradata” field of the VM 
XML settings file: 
>VBoxManage setextradata "VM_NAME" \ 
"VBoxAuthSimple/users/USER_NAME" XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
In this work, we are using the External RDP Authentication and testing both 
VBoxAuth and VBoxAuthSimple libraries with the new TPM machine authentication 
mechanism. 
4.2.1.2 Network 
The virtual machine network adapter must be configured to use “NAT” [38] so that it 
cannot be accessed directly with an IP address and any request must be routed 
through the VirtualBox server itself. “NAT” configuration is the default VirtualBox 
settings when creating new virtual machines. 
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This network adapter configuration ensures that all the remote desktop connection 
requests are sent to the VirtualBox server IP and using the designated VM remote 
display server port (VRDP TCP Port) and accordingly, using one of the two 
VirtualBox external user authentication mechanisms that the new TPM authentication 
module integrates with, VBoxAuth and VBoxAuthSimple. 
4.2.2 TPM 
To be able to start using TPM on a client machine, an administrator or a user with 
sudo privilege must initialize the TPM chip on each client machine’s OS. Also, need 
to install a TPM management tool “TrouSers” [39] to set the TPM owner and SRK 
passwords as well as to create the TPM Endorsement key pairs. 
The following steps [40] ensure that the TPM drivers exist on the client machine and 
are loaded into the kernel then install the TPM management tools and test the 
successful installation: 
i. Enable TPM Security in the client BIOS, making sure that TPM is activated 
ii. Check that the “tpm_tis.ko” TPM module used with version 1.2 exists:  
>ls -la /lib/modules/`uname -r`/kernel/drivers/char/tpm\ 
|grep tpm_tis 
 
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 30344 Jan 30 19:54 tpm_tis.ko 
 
iii. Load the TPM generic Kernel modules and the tpm_tis module into the 
system Kernel: 
>sudo modprobe tpm_bios 
>sudo modprobe tpm 
>sudo modprobe tpm_tis force=1 interrupts=0 
 
iv. Install the TPM management tool “TrouSers”: 
>sudo apt-get install trousers 
>sudo /etc/init.d/tcsd start 
 
v. Test the successful installation of “TrouSers” and check the specification level 
and revision number of the installed TPM chip: 
>sudo tpm_version 
 
TPM 1.2 Version Info: 
Chip Version:        1.2.7.11 
Spec Level:          2 
Errata Revision:     1 
TPM Vendor ID:       BRCM 
TPM Version:         01010000 
Manufacturer Info:   4252434d 
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The next steps, take the ownership of the TPM on the client machine, create an 
Endorsement Key and try to retrieve the public part of that key to make sure we have 
a fully functional TPM. Steps are as follows [40]: 
i. Take ownership of the TPM chip, this sets the owner and the SRK passwords 
and is only allowed once. If a change is needed then the TPM security must be 
disabled in the BIOS then re-enabled and set active and the below commands 
must be run again: 
>sudo tpm_takeownership 
 Enter owner password: XXXXXXXX 
 Confirm password: XXXXXXXX 
 Enter SRK password: YYYYYYYY 
 Confirm password: YYYYYYYY 
 
ii. Create Endorsement Key, this creates the private and public key pairs that are 
unique to the client and cannot be changed: 
>sudo tpm_createek 
 
iii. Test that we can retrieve the public Endorsement Key: 
>sudo tpm_getpubek 
Enter owner password: XXXXXXXX 
Public Endorsement Key: 
  Version:   01010000 
  Usage:     0x0002 (Unknown) 
  Flags:     0x00000000 (!VOLATILE, !MIGRATABLE, 
!REDIRECTION) 
  AuthUsage: 0x00 (Never) 
  Algorithm:         0x00000020 (Unknown) 
  Encryption Scheme: 0x00000012 (Unknown) 
  Signature Scheme:  0x00000010 (Unknown) 
  Public Key: 
8daeb10b 1735639b cb47b440 6a8abbc4 7364084c 
103c05a2 c9cf8a9e cb7f6242 2346e257 efe46735 
edbee3dd 44a1d899 4d5032ae 4b7829d0 595adaa6 
29bad9f7 5f560574 a21a163b 8aeae94b 54563f07 
1db34c39 3813a159 9386e533 c62cc451 c36107eb 
87deb0c9 de3d4a79 c0038cd8 0ff3340b 7f5fb33f 
5ed41de2 ce56f242 2b0dd5a2 6f29d0df 3aefac1d 
ef20c023 3ed3a9a3 f7892733 7f543157 74c05f04 
3717db0d d44e001a 6ed154fe d75f5e09 325a6ee5 
f960975a e70e35bc f4e5b093 f51e46bc 5a28295e 
bf4366b8 43ecf70c fb42fa60 fc3383cd 015cf308 
41a8930a 18eb3ec7 52798583 08067eae 13686186 
b6a09d26 5066cb1b bac686e9 05392a47 
 
We will be using this Public EK as a unique identifier for each client machine in the 
new TPM machine authentication mechanism to control the access to VirtualBox. 
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4.2.3 rDesktop 1.7.1 
Since we need to modify the source code of rDesktop to accommodate the changes 
required for the new TPM machine authentication mechanism, we build the rDesktop 
client from source code on any client machine using the below commands [41]: 
>cd rdesktop1.7.1 source code directory 
>./configure 
>make 
>make install 
 
4.2.4 SQLite 3.8.4.3 
To install SQLite on Ubuntu, the below command is used: 
>sudo apt-get install sqlite3 
 
4.2.5 OpenSSH 
Since we will need to transfer the Public EK file from the client machine to the 
VirtualBox server host through SCP, we need to configure SCP for all users who will 
be using the new TPM authentication mechanism to connect without prompting for a 
password to ensure that the normal operations of the mechanism is not interrupted. 
The below commands are used [42]: 
i. Ensure that the VirtualBox server and all clients are running OpenSSH: 
>ssh –V 
OpenSSH_5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1.1,OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 Mar 2012 
 
If not found, then install OpenSSH. 
ii. Each user to generate RSA key pairs on his client machine using “ssh-
keygen”, providing a passphrase to use to encrypt his private key 
iii. Each user to copy the contents of the public key file “~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub” on his 
client machine and append it to the “.ssh/authorized_keys” file under the his 
home directory on the server 
iv. Permissions must be set to “644” on the  “~/.ssh/authorized_keys” file on the 
server machine for each user 
Each user will need to login from his client machine to the server using SSH and 
provide his passphrase, this will be required only once and afterwards no password 
prompt will be required. 
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4.3 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
4.3.1 SQLite 
In this section, we present the Database design and the fields used and how they are 
initially populated and afterwards modified whenever needed. 
4.3.1.1 Database Design 
Both the Database name and Location are variables declared in the VirtualBox 
Implementation File “VirtualBoxImpl.cpp” located under the path “VirtualBox-
4.3.8/src/VBox/Main/src-server” as part of the new TPM authentication module. 
Table 3 SQLite Database Properties 
Database Name  “VirtualBox_Clients.db” 
Database Location “/home/assers” on the VirtualBox Server 
Table Name Clients 
 
The creation of the table and fields uses a “CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS” 
command that is also embedded in the VirtualBox Implementation File 
“VirtualBoxImpl.cpp”. 
Table 4 SQLite Table Fields 
Field Name Type Primary Key Purpose 
ID Integer YES 
Unique identifier for each client per 
virtual machine. 
Generated automatically by SQLite 
upon addition of new client entry 
VM_Name Text  
Name of the virtual machine that a 
client will be permitted to connect to 
UUID Integer  
Unique ID of the virtual machine, 
generated automatically by VirtualBox 
server upon the creation of a VM 
Client_Name Text  
Name of the client to be permitted the 
connection to a VM 
EK Text  
Copy of the TPM Public Endorsement 
Key of the client machine 
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4.3.1.2 Data Entry  
Table (5) below lists how the SQLite database is created and how it can be modified. 
Table 5 SQLite Data Entry 
Action When How Who 
Database and  
Table Creation 
With the 
creation of the 
first VM in 
VirtualBox 
SQL “CREATE TABLE IF 
NOT EXISTS” command in 
“VirtualBoxImpl.cpp” 
VirtualBox 
Hypervisor  
(New added 
Functionality) 
Database Update 
with VM 
Information 
With the 
creation or 
deletion of a 
VM in 
VirtualBox 
SQL “INSERT” and 
“DELETE” operations in the 
“RegisterMachine” and 
“unregisterMachine” methods 
in “VirtualBoxImpl.cpp” 
VirtualBox 
Hypervisor  
(New added 
Functionality) 
Database Update 
with Client 
Information 
As needed to 
add, modify 
and delete 
clients 
information 
Using the ACL 
administration module that 
will be described in more 
details in section 4.3.2 
Systems 
Administrator  
 
4.3.2 ACL Administration Module 
A BASH script developed to handle all Access Control List administration activities 
by modifying the SQLite Database entries as needed. A system administrator who has 
a privilege to modify the Database should only access this script. We used normal 
UNIX permissions to control this access as needed. 
The BASH script code is presented in Appendix A and Table (6) below lists a full 
description of the different functionalities that can be performed by this script to 
administer the VirtualBox Database: 
Table 6 ACL Administration Module Functions 
# Name Description 
1 Display Clients Database 
Display all entries of the VirtualBox Clients 
Database including all registered virtual 
machines and their UUID along with the 
allowed clients physical machine list per VM 
and their corresponding TPM public 
endorsement key 
2 
Export Clients Database to 
CSV File 
Provide a possibility to export the VirtualBox 
Clients Database entries to a CSV file for an 
easier way to manipulate the exported entries 
for reporting purposes. 
 
It prompts the user to provide a full path and 
file name to use to export the Database 
entries. 
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# Name Description 
3 Add a new client 
Add a new physical machine as an allowed 
client to one of the registered VirtualBox 
VM’s. 
 
It prompts for a choosing an existing virtual 
machine from the Database and verifies that 
the provided virtual machine name exists then 
it prompts to provide a new physical machine 
client name and checks if an entry already 
exist for the same client name to the chosen 
virtual machine; it then prompts to enter the 
full path and file name for the copy of the 
client TPM public endorsement key and 
checks if the provided path and file name 
exists. 
 
It then truncates the TPM EK by removing 
un-needed lines to limit the EK entry in the 
Database only to the exact key to minimize 
the size of the field. 
 
Once all checks are completed, it then inserts 
the new client entry along with the 
corresponding TPM EK to a new entry in the 
Database table for the selected VirtualBox 
virtual machine. 
4 
Modify an existing client name 
(All Entries) 
Modify the name of a physical machine client 
across all its entries in the Database. 
 
It prompts the user to provide the name of the 
client name that is required to be changed 
then verifies that entries in the Database exist 
for this client name. It then prompts for the 
new name of that client machine and verifies 
that this new name does not exist in the 
Database and accordingly changes the name 
across all entries to the new one. 
 
This functionality is required in case a 
physical machine name is changed and this 
change needs to be reflected in the VirtualBox 
Clients Database to ensure the access to the 
VM’s is using the new client name. 
5 
Modify an existing client TPM 
EK (All Entries) 
Modify the TPM EK entry for an existing 
physical machine client across all its entries in 
the Database. 
 
It prompts the user to provide the name of an 
existing client machine in the Database then 
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# Name Description 
verifies that it exists and then prompts the 
user to provide a full path and file name for 
the new TPM EK. It then verifies that this 
TPM EK file exists and then truncates it and 
use it to replace the existing TPM EK data in 
all entries for the selected client machine 
name. 
This functionality is only required in case the 
added TPM EK for a client machine was 
wrong and there is a need to replace it with 
the correct one. 
6 
Delete an existing client 
(Single Entry) 
Delete a single entry of a physical machine 
client for a virtual machine. 
 
It prompts the user to provide a client name 
and verifies that it exists in the Database then 
prompts the user to select the virtual machine 
for which the client entry will be deleted and 
verifies that it also exists in the Database then 
it deletes the selected client name entry for 
that virtual machine. 
 
This functionality is required in case a 
physical machine is no longer allowed to 
access a specific virtual machine and 
accordingly it needs to be removed from the 
VM’s allowed clients list. 
7 
Delete an existing client (All 
Entries) 
Delete all Database entries of a physical 
machine client. 
 
It prompts the user to provide a client name 
and verifies that it exists in the Database then 
prompts for a confirmation from the user that 
all the entries of the selected client name will 
be deleted for all the virtual machines in the 
Database and deletes all the entries 
accordingly. 
 
This functionality is required when a physical 
machine is no longer allowed to access any of 
the registered virtual machines in VirtualBox 
and accordingly all its entries in the Database 
need to be deleted. 
8 Clear all Database Entries 
Delete all the entries in the VirtualBox Clients 
Database. Prompts for a confirmation before 
performing the delete operation and also 
checks if the Database is already empty and 
prompt the user accordingly.  
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# Name Description 
Once the Database is cleared then the virtual 
machines’ information can only be added 
through the VirtualBox server upon creation 
of new VM’s 
9 Quit Exit the BASH script 
 
4.3.3 rDesktop 
rDesktop is used to initiate the remote RDP connection from the client machine to the 
VirtualBox server. In order to develop the new TPM authentication module, we 
modified the rDesktop source code to incorporate the new TPM authentication 
functionality with the client connection string and accordingly send the required 
information regarding the physical machine name, user name and TPM public EK 
content to the VirtualBox server to complete the machine authentication process. 
The changes in the source code were only in one file “rdesktop.c” located directly 
under the rDesktop installation folder. Appendix B presents the patch file that can be 
used to apply the modifications from the original source code file; this patch file was 
generated using Linux “diff” and “patch” commands. 
The changes made to the original source code added the below functionalities to 
rDesktop normal operations: 
i. Define a new command line argument “-w” to be used when TPM 
authentication is required. Without using this new arguments there will be no 
change in the normal rDekstop operations 
ii. Upon using the “-w” argument, the TPM management command 
“tpm_getpubek” is used to generate the client TPM public endorsement key 
and redirects the output to a file under the user’s home directory after 
appending the host name and the user name to it. The user is prompted at this 
step to provide the TPM owner password for this physical client machine 
iii. The VirtualBox server Name or IP address is then extracted from the rDesktop 
connection string provided by the user 
iv. Using Linux “sed” command, the generated TPM public EK file is truncated 
to remove all the un-needed lines so that we minimize the size of the file 
before sending it to the VirtualBox server. This matches the format of the 
TPM public EK for the clients added to the VirtualBox clients Database using 
the ACL administration module 
v. Using Linux “scp” command, the new truncated TPM public EK is then 
transferred to the VirtualBox server under the “/tmp” directory and deleted 
from the initiating client machine and then the RDP connection request is 
processed normally 
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Exceptions handled to delete the generated TPM key in case of failure in sending it to 
the VirtualBox server. Also, to terminate the RDP request if the provided TPM owner 
password is not correct or if the “-w” argument is used from a physical client machine 
with no TPM hardware chip. 
4.3.4 VirtualBox 
To incorporate the new TPM authentication module with the VirtualBox normal 
operations, we modified three VirtualBox source code files to handle the new TPM 
authentication functionalities. 
The changes made to the source code are classified into two main categories as listed 
below. 
4.3.4.1 Populating the ACL with VirtualBox virtual machines info 
As mentioned in section 4.3.1, the initial ACL Database creation is performed with 
the creation of the first virtual machine within VirtualBox. The changes done to 
handle this are added to the file “VirtualBoxImpl.cpp” located under the path 
“VirtualBox-4.3.8/src/VBox/Main/src-server”. 
In addition to the initial Database creation, the below functionalities are also added to 
the same source code file: 
i. Upon registering a new virtual machine in VirtualBox, insert a new entry for 
the virtual machine into the ACL Database including the VM Name and VM 
UUID. This includes newly created virtual machines as well as virtual 
machines that are cloned from existing ones 
ii. Upon un-registering a virtual machine in VirtualBox, delete all the 
corresponding entries for that virtual machines from the ACL Database 
Appendix C presents the patch file that can be used to apply the modifications from 
the original source code file. 
4.3.4.2 Handling the client machine TPM Authentication 
To be able to add the TPM machine authentication prior to VirtualBox normal user 
authentication, we modified the two source files handling the possible “External” 
authentication methods for virtual machines as follows: 
 VBoxAuthPAM.c  
Located under the path “VirtualBox-4.3.8/src/VBox/HostServices/auth/pam”, 
modified to perform the below functionalities: 
i. Define the path to the ACL Database that will be used to check the allowed 
physical clients for each virtual machine along with their corresponding TPM 
public EK data 
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ii. Retrieve the UUID of the virtual machine accepting the RDP connection 
request from a physical client 
iii. Compare the ACL Database entry for the physical machine trying to connect 
to a virtual machine with the received information with the request. This is 
done using the name of the physical machine, the user name initiating the 
RDP connection request and the TPM public EK file received with the 
connection request 
iv. If a successful match is found in the ACL Database, TPM machine 
authentication is successful and VirtualBox then proceeds to the normal user 
authentication process using the Linux PAM service.  
v. The received TPM file from the client machine is deleted after the TPM 
authentication process is completed whether it is successful or not 
Appendix D presents the patch file that can be used to apply the modifications from 
the original source code file. 
 VBoxAuthSimple.cpp 
Located under the path “VirtualBox-4.3.8/src/VBox/HostServices/auth/simple”, 
modified to perform the below functionalities: 
i. Define the path to the ACL Database that will be used to check the allowed 
physical clients for each virtual machine along with their corresponding TPM 
public EK data 
ii. Compare the ACL Database entry for the physical machine trying to connect 
to a virtual machine with the received information with the request. This is 
done using the name of the physical machine, the user name initiating the 
RDP connection request and the TPM public EK file received with the 
connection request 
iii. If a successful match is found in the ACL Database, TPM machine 
authentication is successful and VirtualBox then proceeds to the normal user 
authentication process against the user accounts configured per virtual 
machine in the “extradata” fields in each VM XML settings file 
iv. The received TPM file from the client machine is deleted after the TPM 
authentication process is completed whether it is successful or not 
Appendix E presents the patch file that can be used to apply the modifications from 
the original source code file. 
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5 RESULTS 
In this chapter, we present the testing plans for the newly developed TPM 
authentication mechanism along with the results achieved. We describe in full the 
details of how we conducted the tests with explanation of the additional tools used to 
automate the testing process. 
5.1 TESTING ENVIRONMENT 
The setup of the testing environment for this new mechanism is as follows: 
 VirtualBox Server:  
Dell Precision M4500 Intel Core i7 Quad core processor with 8 GB RAM and a TPM 
chip version 1.2, Spec level 2 manufactured by Broadcom running Ubuntu Desktop 
12.04 LTS "Precise Pangolin" 64-bit as the OS 
 Client:  
Dell Latitude D630 Intel Core 2 Duo Dual Core processor with 4 GB RAM and a 
TPM chip version 1.2, Spec level 2 manufactured by Broadcom running Ubuntu 
Desktop 12.04 LTS "Precise Pangolin" 64-bit as the OS 
 Network:  
10/100 Ethernet shared (not dedicated) Local Area Network 
5.2 TESTING APPROACH 
To be able to measure the performance of this new mechanism, two tests were 
conducted for each of the VirtualBox Authentication Mechanisms, one using the 
developed TPM Authentication module and one without it. These tests are conducted 
by initiating a request to establish a remote desktop display connection to a VM 
hosted on the VirtualBox server and measuring the time taken to authenticate and 
connect.  
The VirtualBox authentication mechanisms tested are: 
 VBoxAuth (referred to afterwards as PAM): Using the Linux PAM system to 
authenticate the users requesting remote desktop connection to a VM, users must 
have login accounts on the VirtualBox Server host machine 
 VBoxAuthSimple: User Authentication handled by using the “extradata” fields in 
each VM’s XML settings file where users & passwords can be added individually 
for each VM hosted on the VirtualBox Server 
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We used the comparisons between the differences in the average run times for five 
cases to illustrate the efficiency of the developed mechanism: 
 Difference between PAM authentication with and without TPM authentication 
 Difference between VBoxAuthSimple authentication with and without TPM 
authentication 
 Difference between PAM & VBoxAuthSimple authentication using TPM 
authentication 
 Difference between PAM & VBoxAuthSimple authentication without using TPM 
 Overall comparison between using and not using TPM authentication 
In addition, we calculated the standard deviation for each of the four authentication 
combinations of test runs (PAM with TPM authentication, PAM without TPM 
authentication, VBoxAuthSimple with TPM authentication and VBoxAuthSimple 
without TPM authentication) to measure the fluctuation amongst the individual runs 
itself. 
5.3 TPM MODULE TESTING 
Since the normal run time of a single connection request from a rDesktop client to the 
VirtualBox server is less than one second, accordingly to be able to test the 
performance of the new mechanism correctly a number of remote desktop 
connections to a Windows 8 VM are executed sequentially to compute the overall 
average time to connect with and without the TPM authentication module. Each test 
conducted by using runs of counts (10, 30, 50, 70, 100, 200 & 300) for each of the 
two VirtualBox user authentication mechanisms. 
The format for connecting to VirtualBox VM using rDesktop when TPM 
authentication is required is in the form: 
rdesktop –u USERNAME –p – -w \ 
VIRTUALBOX_SERVER:VM_VRDP_PORT  
 
Where: 
 USERNAME is the account used to connect to the VirtualBox server whether we 
are using the PAM or VBoxAuthSimple user authentication mechanisms 
 “-p -“, is directing rdesktop to prompt the user for a password to use to establish 
the connection to the VirtualBox server and again this is whether we are using the 
PAM or VBoxAuthSimple user authentication mechanisms 
 “-w”, is the new added option to specify using TPM authentication with this 
connection request 
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 VIRTUALBOX_SERVER is the VirtualBox server host name or IP address 
 VM_VRDP_PORT is the remote desktop unique port number for the destination 
VM as configured on VirtualBox server 
Since TPM authentication integrates now with rdesktop as part of the new mechanism 
and it changes the standard connection string format in case TPM authentication is 
required to establish the connection so accordingly, it prompts for providing the TPM 
Owner Password on the client machine trying to connect to the VirtualBox VM to be 
able to generate the TPM EK. This prompt requires an input from the user before 
rdesktop establishes the connection to the VirtualBox server.  
To eliminate the need for a user intervention and automate the connection request 
without any user input prompts, “Expect” [43] tool is installed on client machines and 
used as shown in the below script to provide the TPM Owner password when 
prompted [44].  
 
Figure 10 "Expect" Script 
The USER_PASSWORD depends on which VirtualBox user authentication method is 
used. If using PAM, the user name and password authenticates against the Linux 
PAM system while if VBoxAuthSimple is used, the user name and password 
authenticates against the VM’s XML file extradata content. However, in the case of 
VBoxAuthSimple, we also need the same user name created on the VirtualBox server 
not only on the VM level and ensure that seamless SCP access exists to that account 
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to copy the generated TPM EK securely from the client to the VirtualBox server. The 
Host and VM accounts do not need to have the same password. 
To be able to run multiple connections using the “Expect” script, “GNU Parallel” 
[45], a GNU tool used to execute commands or scripts in parallel either on one or 
more computers, is used to run a number of sequential instances of the connection 
script with various counts against each of the VirtualBox user authentication 
mechanisms. This is required so that we can compute the average run time over a 
sizable set of connections. The counts used are (10, 30, 50, 70, 100, 200 & 300). 
The command used to run the test is as follows [46]: 
seq RUN_COUNT | parallel --joblog LOG_FILE \ 
PATH_TO_EXPECT_SCRIPT 
 
Where: 
 RUN_COUNT is the count of times the script is needed to run, for this testing the 
run count is set for each of (10, 30, 50, 70, 100, 200 & 300) and the output results 
measured for each 
 LOG_FILE is the full path to the output log file that records the timing of each 
job in the parallel run 
 PATH_TO_EXPECT_SCRIPT is the full path to the Expect script containing the 
connection string and passwords used to establish the remote desktop connection 
to the destination VM 
For each test per authentication module, we examined VirtualBox log files 
(VRDP.log and VBoxAuthSimple.log) to ensure that all connection requests to the 
destination VM were successful.  
5.4 TEST RESULTS 
The detailed output results obtained from the test runs are listed in Appendix F to 
illustrate the run times for individual jobs as well as the average run time for each of 
the batch counts. 
5.5 TEST RESULTS ANALYSIS 
To summarize the obtained test results in Appendix F, Table (7) below presents the 
average run times per count for each authentication category followed by comparison 
graphs and corresponding analysis for the findings. 
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Table 7 Test Results Summary 
Test Results Summary 
# Runs 
Avg. Run Time - 
TPM PAM 
Avg. Run Time - 
No TPM PAM 
Avg. Run Time –  
TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
Avg. Run Time –  
No TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
10 0.98 0.21 1.05 0.22 
30 1.02 0.2 0.87 0.23 
50 0.91 0.19 0.86 0.21 
70 0.90 0.19 0.88 0.17 
100 0.96 0.22 0.87 0.19 
200 0.90 0.19 0.88 0.21 
300 0.89 0.21 0.94 0.16 
Avg. 0.94 0.20 0.90 0.20 
 
5.5.1 Difference between PAM authentication with and without TPM authentication 
 
Figure 11 PAM Authentication with and without TPM 
Figure (11) above shows the difference between the average run times when using 
VirtualBox PAM authentication with and without TPM authentication. Using TPM 
Authentication with PAM introduced a delay of 0.74 seconds (Original average 
runtime using PAM alone is 0.2, added cost for TPM authentication is 370%).  
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This is due to the time taken to generate and transfer the TPM Public EK between the 
client and the VirtualBox Server, in addition to the time taken to read the content of 
the file and compare it to the client’s entry in the ACL then accordingly decide 
whether to proceed or not with the user authentication using Linux PAM. 
5.5.2 Difference between VBoxAuthSimple authentication with and without TPM 
authentication 
 
Figure 12 VBoxAuthSimple Authentication with and without TPM 
Figure (12) above shows the difference between the average run times when using 
VirtualBox VBoxAuthSimple authentication with and without TPM authentication. 
Using TPM Authentication with VBoxAuthSimple introduced a delay of 0.7 seconds 
(Original average runtime using VBoxAuthSimple is 0.2, added cost for TPM 
authentication is 350%). 
This is due to the time taken to generate and transfer the TPM Public EK between the 
client and VirtualBox, in addition to the time taken to read the content of the file and 
compare it to the client’s entry in the ACL then accordingly decide whether to 
proceed or not with the user authentication using the client VM’s extradata settings. 
5.5.3 Difference between PAM & VBoxAuthSimple using TPM authentication 
Figure (13) below shows the difference in the average run times for using TPM 
authentication with PAM and VBoxAuthSimple. This comparison shows that both 
mechanisms while using TPM almost have the same performance (VBoxAuthSimple 
is slightly better than PAM with just 0.04 seconds which can be negligible). 
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Figure 13 PAM and VBoxAuthSimple using TPM Authentication 
5.5.4 Difference between PAM & VBoxAuthSimple without using TPM 
Figure (14) below shows the comparison between the average run time of the two 
VirtualBox authentication mechanisms without the use of the new TPM module. As 
shown, both mechanisms have the same performance on average of 0.2 seconds. 
 
Figure 14 PAM and VBoxAuthSimple without using TPM Authentication 
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5.5.5 Overall comparison between using and not using TPM authentication 
Figure (15) below shows the overall test summary for the four different authentication 
mechanisms combinations, it is noticeable that the introduced delay due to the TPM 
authentication mechanism is almost the same when used with different VirtualBox 
user authentication mechanisms. The time taken to generate the TPM Public EK and 
transfer over the network then read it and compare its content with the clients’ entries 
in the ACL is almost constant regardless of the user authentication method used. 
It also shows that the difference in the average runtime between using TPM with 
PAM and using TPM with VBoxAuthSimple is only 0.04 seconds. While there is no 
difference in the average runtime between using PAM and VBoxAuthSimple without 
TPM, which emphasizes that by using TPM with any of these user authentication 
modules the difference in the average runtime between them is almost equal whether 
TPM is used or not. Accordingly, TPM authentication can be used with any of the 
VirtualBox user authentication mechanisms since the overhead introduced is almost 
the same for both.  
As mentioned earlier in section 5.2, a note to be taken into consideration for 
VBoxAuthSimple is that even though the actual user authentication is done on the 
VM level and not on the VirtualBox host level still, the user account used must also 
exist on the VirtualBox server as it will be used by SCP to transfer the file from the 
client to the Server for the machine authentication to take place. This user account 
does not have to have the same password on both levels. 
 
Figure 15 Overall Test Summary 
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5.5.6 Standard Deviation Comparison between using and not using TPM  
Figure (16) below shows the standard Deviation calculation between the different run 
times for each category of the four authentication combinations. It shows that the 
standard deviation between the individual runs is higher when using TPM for 
authentication. This is due to the fact of introducing dependency on TPM EK file 
transfer between the client and the server machines over the network so accordingly 
the time taken to establish a connection will vary for each time a user submits an 
initial connection request based on the network utilization at that time as one of the 
affecting factors.  
However, the measured standard deviation is not that high with a maximum of 0.07 
seconds when using TPM with VBoxAuthSimple. 
 
Figure 16 Standard Deviation between Runs 
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6 DISCUSSION  
In this chapter, we discuss the different methods used during the implementation of 
this proposed model in terms of implementation techniques and alternative 
approaches available as well as the verification tests used to ensure the proper 
functionality of this new TPM authentication model.  
We also present a security analysis of the different solution components in addition to 
an analysis of the associated cost of implementation and execution.   
6.1 IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH 
This work is only targeting the security of Remote Desktop Connections, not 
command line access as it is utilizing the VRDP capabilities in VirtualBox. In 
addition, command line access to VM’s will not be possible since the VM’s are 
configured to access the network using NAT not Bridged networking so their IP’s 
will not be published and no one will be able to access them through the command 
line. If specific traffic is needed to be routed to a VM directly, Port Forwarding can 
be configured within the VirtualBox environment to handle this requirement. 
In the following three sub-sections, we present a comparison between the original 
TPM authentication mechanism using a third-party privacy certificate authority, the 
new Direct Anonymous Attestation mechanism developed for TPM version 1.2 
specifications and the proposed model in the scope of this work where we use TPM 
EK directly. We also provide a justification of why using any of the current TPM 
authentication mechanisms will not be possible for the overall proposed solution. 
6.1.1 Original TPM Remote Attestation Mechanism 
The original remote attestation mechanism for clients using TPM is as illustrated 
Figure (17) where any TPM enabled client need to follow the below steps to connect 
to a server [47]: 
 TPM enabled client sends its EK and AIK to a third party Privacy Certificate 
Authority (PCA) so that it verifies that the generated AIK is from a genuine TPM 
module 
 The PCA replies back with a certificate issued only to the originating EK for that 
specific TPM client 
 The TPM client then uses the supplied certificate from the PCA to access the 
required server 
 The server can now verifies that the connection request is from a genuine TPM 
client (without knowing any information about the client itself) and accordingly 
grant access to any requested service 
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Figure 17 TPM Remote Attestation Model 
 
The original TPM remote attestation mechanism has the following characteristics: 
 TPM creates different AIK’s for every access request to a server 
 The TPM AIK does not have an identifier for the originating client identity, the 
server will allow access from any client with a certified AIK from a PCA and 
accordingly the originating client is not known to the server accepting the 
connection 
This original mechanism has some known problems that the PCA must be involved in 
all the transactions between the client and the server and accordingly it must be 
always available and at the same time must be well secured which is contradicting. In 
addition, if there is a privacy requirement then it may be at risk if the PCA and the 
verifying server exchange information directly which in that case will allow the 
server to directly identify the TPM client [48], [49].  
In addition to that, since the verifying server must be trusting the PCA and is sure that 
it is issuing a certificate only to a valid TPM, this entails that PCA can’t be run by 
end users or private organizations [50]. 
6.1.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation Mechanism  
With the problems raised against the original TPM remote attestation mechanism, 
IBM, Intel and HP worked together along with TCG to develop a new direct 
anonymous attestation mechanism that is available now with TPM version 1.2 
specifications. This new mechanism is designed by Ernie Brickell of Intel, Jan 
Camenisch of IBM and Liqun Chen of HP [51]. 
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DAA is aiming to provide a remote attestation procedure that does not provide a 
certificate from a trusted authority but instead use cryptographic proof that the 
connecting client has one [50]. 
DAA mechanism as illustrated in Figure (18) below works as follows [50]: 
 During the JOIN initial step, the DAA issuer will verify the TPM platform and 
then will issue DAA signature to the platform 
 The Platform will then proceed to the SIGN step where it proves to the verifier 
that it has a DAA signature from the issuer 
 
Figure 18 DAA Mechanism 
This mechanism possess the below characteristics: 
 The DAA issuer and verifier cannot link 
 The DAA signature is only needed to be issued once by the issuer which can be a 
manufacturer or the organization owning the platform 
 The mechanism provides a black listing functionality to allow the verifier to block 
requests from TPM’s that are suspected to be fraudulent [52] 
 The platform transactions with the verifier are always anonymous but the 
mechanism allow a level of controlled privacy using Name Based solution 
between the platform and the verifier to be able to link transactions from the same 
platform to perform platform profiling and be able to block requests from a 
platform generating too many transactions 
 DAA provides a variety of balances between security and privacy by choosing 
one of the below models [51]: 
o Random base – for privacy sensitive cases 
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o Named base – for non privacy-sensitive cases 
o A combination of both models 
6.1.3 Proposed TPM Machine Authentication Mechanism 
The characteristics of the original remote attestation mechanism does not allow for a 
true identification of the client attempting to access a server since with each new 
request a new different AIK will be created and verified by the PCA and sent to the 
server without any information on the requesting client.  
In addition, with DAA complete anonymity and the ability to detect fraud TPMs seem 
to be opposing goals. Some compromise of anonymity must be made to allow 
fraudulent TPM keys to be detected by verifiers and even though an additional level 
of flexibility in terms of anonymity is available, still the identity of the client is not 
shown to the verifying server. 
Since the main requirement for the proposed model is to reveal the identity of the 
client to the server directly to provide a client identification approach that we can use 
in a machine authentication mechanism, this proposed model will not be dependent 
on either the use of PCA / TPM AIK or the use of DAA.  
 
 
Figure 19 Proposed TPM Authentication Mechanism 
As illustrated in Figure (19) above, the proposed mechanism works as follows: 
 The client will  send its TPM EK - which is a unique identifier of a client - along 
with the client machine name to the target server receiving the connection request  
 The server will then authenticate the client against a pre-defined ACL that already 
contains a copy of the TPM EK for each authorized client along with the client 
machine name and a list of all virtual machines that this client has permissions to 
access 
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This proposed mechanism will guarantee that the server is aware of the identity of the 
hardware client attempting to connect and is authenticating it directly and granting the 
required access based on a well-known ACL. 
Since privacy is a problem for security, having a highly secured environment entails a 
low level of privacy, and vice versa, there has to be somehow a compromise to ensure 
a level of security exists. Especially in private cloud environments where complete 
anonymity is not required to strengthen the security measures, the proposed 
mechanism can provide a good solution to organizations aiming to controlling access 
to their virtual environments across several teams and at the same time ensure that it 
is only accessed from authenticated hardware platforms with authenticated user 
accounts. 
6.2 MECHANISM VERIFICATION 
To verify the developed TPM authentication model and since it is integrated with the 
source code of the two main components of the solution VirtualBox and rDesktop, we 
need to ensure that it is not affecting any of their normal functionalities either being 
in a standalone mode or when interacting with each other. We conducted a set of tests 
for the standard use cases representing the normal functionalities performed by both 
tools without using the new TPM authentication mechanism to detect any impact 
caused by adding this new module to the normal operational activities. 
Tables (8 & 9) below presents the test cases and their corresponding test results for all 
the normal functionalities of VirtualBox and rDesktop. 
Table 8 TPM Model Verification - VirtualBox Use Cases 
VirtualBox 
Use Case Test Result 
Invoking VirtualBox GUI (VirtualBox) Pass 
VirtualBox preferences modification through GUI Pass 
Managing VirtualBox through command line  
(VBoxManag & Vheadless) 
Pass 
VM Creation Pass 
VM Cloning (Full and Linked) Pass 
VM Deletion Pass 
VM Settings modification through GUI Pass 
VM Settings modification using command line Pass 
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VirtualBox 
Use Case Test Result 
Default user Authentication library loaded (VBoxAuth - PAM) 
through GUI 
Pass 
Alternate user Authentication library loaded (VBoxAuthSimple) 
through GUI 
Pass 
Default user Authentication library loaded (VBoxAuth - PAM) 
through command line 
Pass 
Alternate user Authentication library loaded (VBoxAuthSimple) 
through command line 
Pass 
VRDP Authentication settings modification through GUI Pass 
VRDP Authentication settings modification through command line Pass 
Remote connections established to virtual machines not using 
External user Authentication (using either Null or Guest 
authentication) 
Pass 
Import and Export of VM images Pass 
 
Table 9 TPM Model Verification - rDesktop Use Cases 
rDekstop 
Use Case Test Result 
rDesktop can connect to remote machines without TPM authentication 
if the "-w" option is not specified in the connection command 
Pass 
rDesktop usage info displayed if no arguments are passed Pass 
 
As shown in Tables (8 & 9) above, the new TPM authentication mechanism is not 
affecting any functionality for VirtualBox or rDesktop.  
In addition, rDesktop can be used with or without TPM authentication using the “-w” 
command line option as needed. VirtualBox VRDP “Null” and “Guest” 
authentication are working normally without TPM authentication, only if VRDP 
authentication is set to “External” will the TPM authentication module be loaded and 
used with the specified user Authentication library for VirtualBox. 
6.3 SECURITY ASSESSMENT  
In this section, we discuss the security of the several model components along with 
future possible enhancements that can be made to increase the security level of the 
mechanism. The security of VirtualBox and rDesktop are excluded from the scope of 
this assessment. 
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6.3.1 Communication 
To establish a secure communication channel between the clients and the VirtualBox 
server, we used OpenSSH [26] and configured authorized key pairs for each client 
machine so that users can connect seamlessly and transfer the TPM EK to the server 
without being promoted for a password. 
Furthermore, scp being part of OpenSSH is used to securely transfer the TPM EK 
during the authentication process. 
OpenSSH and scp provide an encrypted communication channel over the network 
using the SSH protocol and like all software tools, need to always be updated to their 
latest released versions to ensure that they are less vulnerable to security attacks. The 
latest OpenSSH version is 6.7 released in October 2014 [26]. 
6.3.2 Database 
The Database used to host the ACL is SQLite version 3.8.3, SQLite is one of the most 
widely used Database engines for application development on multiple platforms and 
is being maintained by various vendors like Oracle, Adobe and Mozilla [27]. The 
latest available version is 3.8.6 released in August 2014 [27]. 
SQLite database is not requiring a server process, it accesses the disk directly and the 
database itself is a single file. In the scope of this work, the Database file is located on 
the local hard disk of the VirtualBox server machine however; it can be easily placed 
on a network storage device with secure access as long as the correct permissions are 
set.  
As a future enhancement to the proposed model, the SQLite database can be 
encrypted to provide a more secure access using a passphrase and encryption keys. 
Two encryption tools for SQLite, SQLiteCrypt [53] and SQLCipher [54] can be used 
to encrypt the Database. While both uses 256-bit AES encryption, SQLCipher is 
known to have an overhead between 5-15% for the encryption [54] while 
SQLiteCrypt is known to have a good performance as it only encrypts and decrypts 
the data block being accessed and not the entire Database [53]. 
6.3.3 User Accounts 
All user accounts used within the scope of this work are local accounts with the same 
user name and password on the clients and VirtualBox server to enable password -
less communication – in addition to the authorized OpenSSH keys for each account - 
while using scp to transfer the TPM EK. We can achieve the same model using 
directory services (NIS / LDAP) where we can create centralized accounts that we 
can use across all machines. 
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The password-less communication setup has to be done per account per client 
machine, which ensures that each user must create RSA key pairs for his account on 
each client he will be using to access the VirtualBox server. 
In addition, as an increased security measure, the user must provide the TPM owner 
password for his client to extract the TPM EK upon initiating the rDesktop 
connection to the VirtualBox server. This ensures that even if someone is using a 
client machine with an opened terminal from an authenticated user, he will not be 
able to connect to VirtualBox without knowing the TPM owner password.  
As discussed in section 5.2, we can automate the TPM owner password input using 
the “expect” [43] script however this will weaken the security of the mechanism as 
the TPM owner password will be easier to attack since it has to be written in clear 
text in a local file on the disk. 
6.3.4 File System 
As discussed in section 6.3.2, the Database file is located on the local hard disk of the 
VirtualBox server machine but for enhanced security, it would be preferred to host it 
on a network storage device with secure access permissions. 
The client TPM EK is extracted into a file located in the home directory of the user 
initiating the connection request to VirtualBox and sent with the connection request 
using scp to /tmp directory on the server. The destination folder on the server can be 
changed to any other local folder on the server or to a location on a more secure 
network storage device with the required access permissions to allowed users. 
The local TPM EK file is removed from the home directory of the user on the client 
machine once it is sent to the server with the connection request, also the file on /tmp 
on the server is removed once the authentication process is completed and access is 
granted or rejected. 
6.3.5 Security Threats 
To summarize, Table (10) below lists the possible security threats to the new 
mechanism with explanation of each: 
Table 10 New Mechanism Security Threats 
Threat Description Mitigation 
TPM Public EK 
of a machine is 
revealed 
If someone can get hold of the 
TPM public EK of a machine 
and at the same time is able to 
alter the source code for 
rDesktop to use the 
compromised TPM EK and  
have knowledge of how 
VirtualBox is handling the 
Client machines authentication 
As a future enhancement, 
use Private Key of TPM 
in a challenge response 
authentication process 
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Threat Description Mitigation 
Using TPM then he can have 
access to VM’s in VirtualBox  
Database Location 
and Encryption 
Database file is located on a 
local storage and is not 
encrypted, if someone can 
access the database file directly 
and alter the content then he can 
have access to VM’s in 
VirtualBox 
Move Database to a 
more secured network 
storage and encrypt the 
database file with tools 
like SQLiteCrypt and 
SQLCipher 
Un-privileged access 
to the ACL Admin 
Module  
If access to the ACL Admin 
Module is compromised then 
someone can have an un- 
privileged access to alter the 
contents of the ACL database  
Restrict the access to the 
ACL Admin Module, 
Ensure that it is located in 
a secure network storage. 
As a future enhancement, 
additional  authentication 
layer can be added before 
invoking this Admin 
Module 
 
6.4 COST ANALYSIS 
In this section, we review the cost associated with this new TPM authentication 
mechanism, from implementation as well as execution point of views. 
6.4.1 Implementation Cost 
For a service provider or an organization to implement this new mechanism, the 
following activities must be performed, for each of the activities we highlight the 
frequency at which they need to be performed. 
 rDesktop must be built from its source files using the modified file listed in 
Appendix-B to incorporate the new TPM authentication functionality. This has to 
be performed on each client machine required to access the VirtualBox server. A 
normal user without a need for root privileges can perform it and in this case, this 
will only allow this user to use the modified version of rDesktop. Another 
alternative is to have a system administrator with root privileges to install it on the 
client machine for all users or better, to install it on a network shared location 
where all users on all systems can have access to it by adjusting their $PATH 
variable to point to the required binaries of the modified rDesktop tool 
 SQLite package must be installed on the VirtualBox server or network storage as 
needed to host the ACL. This is a one-time operation that must be performed by a 
system administrator with root privileges to ensure secure access to the database 
 VirtualBox must be built from its source files using the modified files listed in 
Appendices C, D & E to incorporate the new TPM authentication functionality. 
VirtualBox Extension pack must also be installed to allow for the “external” 
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authentication for virtual machine. This is a one-time operation to be performed 
on the server hosting the VirtualBox environment and must be performed by a 
system administrator with root privileges to ensure secure access on the 
VirtualBox server and also to ensure that the ACL hosted in the SQLite database 
is only accessed by the system administrator 
 For each virtual machine created inside VirtualBox, the system administrator 
must define the VRDP authentication mechanism required; in this case, it should 
be set to “external” to load the TPM authentication module. In addition, for every 
virtual machine the network settings must be configured to use “NAT” to ensure 
that all connection requests are routed only through the host. This is a one-time 
operation per virtual machine whether the virtual machine is newly created in 
VirtualBox or is imported from a previous installation 
 The system administrator of VirtualBox will also need to define the authentication 
library used with “external” authentication methods for virtual machines. This is a 
one-time operation performed on the server level to configure either using 
“VBoxAuth” or “VBoxAuthSimple” libraries 
 The system administrator must create the user accounts for users accessing the 
VirtualBox environment; this can be done using accounts already created on a 
directory service like NIS or LDAP. If “VBoxAuthSimple” authentication library 
is used, the system administrator will also need to add the allowed accounts per 
virtual machine to the XML settings file per VM. This is an on-going operation as 
needed to add or modify users of the system 
 The initial creation of the ACL database as well as the on-going addition or 
removal of VirtualBox virtual machines to the ACL is done automatically with 
the creation or removal of virtual machines in VirtualBox. No implementation 
cost is associated with this activity 
 To add clients to the ACL of the TPM authentication module, the system 
administrator will need to use the developed ACL administration module script 
listed in Appendix-A. It can be placed locally on the VirtualBox server or on a 
network storage location with access permissions to the SQLite database. This is 
an on-going operation  to add, remove or modify client machines for each virtual 
machine in VirtualBox 
 User requiring access to the VirtualBox server will need to create RSA key pairs 
for SSH and add them to the “authorized_Keys” file to allow for password-less 
connection from each client being used to the VirtualBox server. This is a one-
time operation per user on each client machine 
 For each client machine, TPM must be enabled and initialized and ownership set 
with a password that will be used during establishing the connection to the 
VirtualBox server. This is a one-time operation that is performed by the system 
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administrator through the installation of TPM management tools on the client 
machine and setting the owner password 
6.4.2 Execution Cost  
The execution cost associated with the use of this new TPM authentication 
mechanism can be classified as follows: 
 Network overhead introduced with the sending of the TPM EK from the client 
machine to the VirtualBox server 
The original TPM EK file is of size 4 KB and contains some un-needed lines so we 
truncated the file to limit the data we send form the client to the server to include only 
the public key signature lines as illustrated in Figures (20) and (21) below. The new 
truncated file is almost 4 KB in size as well so the network overhead introduced by 
this new mechanism is only an additional 4 KB over the connection request. 
 Overall cost overhead in terms of connection time introduced with the use of the 
new authentication mechanism 
As discussed in chapter 5, Using TPM Authentication with PAM (VBoxAuth) 
introduced a delay of 0.74 seconds while the original average runtime using PAM 
alone is 0.2 seconds. The cost overhead accordingly is around 370%.  
In addition, Using TPM Authentication with VBoxAuthSimple introduced a delay of 
0.7 seconds while the original average runtime using VBoxAuthSimple is 0.2 
seconds. The cost overhead accordingly is around 350%. 
The introduced overall delay in establishing the connection is due to the fact of 
introducing a dependency on the TPM EK file transfer between the client and the 
server machines over the network and the time needed to read it and compare its 
content with the clients’ entries in the ACL.  Since the mechanism is network 
dependent, the connection processing time might vary from one time to another based 
on the network utilization however, the calculated standard deviation over multiple 
runs shows a maximum of 0.07 seconds variation when using VBoxAuthSimple and 
only 0.05 seconds when using PAM (VBoxAuth) as illustrated in Figure (16) in 
section 5.4.6. 
This introduced delay is only required once with the initial connection establishment 
between the client machine and the VirtualBox server and no overhead is added for 
any further requests once the remote desktop connection is established. Even though 
the overhead is ranging from 350-370%, the actual delay in terms of time is a 
maximum of 0.74 seconds. 
 The use of network storage devices instead of local hard disks on clients and 
server machines to host the SQLite database or the temporary TPM EK file might 
also introduce some cost during the execution depending on the I/O throughput of 
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the storage device. This is outside the scope of this work but the assumption 
would be that the introduced overhead at that time would also be very low. 
 
Figure 20 Original TPM EK 
 
Figure 21 Truncated TPM EK 
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This work discussed a new machine authentication mechanism using TPM that allows 
organizations and cloud service providers the possibility of identifying physical 
hardware clients attempting to establish a remote desktop connection to the graphical 
user interface of virtual machines. This mechanism in conjunction with the normal 
user authentication processes can provide a better way of controlling and restricting 
the access to virtual machines based on a pre-defined access control list. Accordingly, 
we can use it to ensure proper setup of multi-tenancy environments.  
It also provides a way to prevent malicious insiders from performing un-authorized 
activities as it combines the hardware and the user accounts into a single 
authentication process. This authentication process depends mainly on identifying 
hardware clients and associating it with several user level authentication steps that 
combines the TPM owner password per machine with the normal user name and 
password authentication as well as an access control list to determine the allowed 
access privileges. 
This new authentication mechanism proves that it is possible to use TPM 
Endorsement Key directly to identify a hardware client without using a third party 
Privacy Certificate Authority or using Direct Anonymous Attestation. The only 
concern with using this new mechanism would be anonymity and privacy as the 
identity of the hardware client has to be revealed however, specifically in private 
clouds or in any cloud environment where security is the main focus, this mechanism 
can be used without any concerns.   
The cost overhead associated with using this new mechanism is relatively small, with 
a maximum value of 0.74 seconds per connection request that is only added once per 
session. This small value can be overlooked taken into consideration the security 
benefits gained from using this mechanism. 
As a promising path, we can use TPM Private Keys for a challenge- response key 
exchange authentication process to secure this new mechanism in case the TPM 
public Keys are compromised. Something similar to STS Protocol (Station-to-
Station) which is a variation of the Diffie-Hellman, first key-exchange protocol but 
altered to prevent the man in the middle attack by using mutual authentication 
between the two communicating parties [55], [56].  
Also, this mechanism can be ported to other platforms to support different clients 
other than Linux or even support other Hypervisors than VirtualBox. In addition, a 
beneficial future direction would be to associate it with other TPM related research 
activities to enable the verification of the loaded software stack on each client and to 
perform an identity and integrity check on the cloud server platform.  
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With the association of this mechanism that is mainly focusing on the client side with 
other mechanisms that target the server side, cloud service providers as well as 
organizations hosting private clouds would benefit from a complete secure solution to 
their cloud environments.  
They can ensure access is granted to specific client machines as defined in an ACL 
that also have a desirable software stack to specific resources, whether to virtual 
machines or to storage devices or even to networks.  
At the same time, clients would benefit from having the assurance that the identity 
and integrity of the cloud server provider is checked before the connection is 
established and they start accessing the required cloud service. 
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APPENDIX A – ACL ADMINISTRATION MODULE 
#! /bin/bash 
 
MENU=" 
1   Display Clients Database  
2   Export Clients Database to CSV File 
3   Add a new client  
4   Modify an existing client name (All Entries) 
5   Modify an existing client TPM EK (All Entries) 
6   Delete an existing client (Single Entry) 
7   Delete an existing client (All Entries) 
8   Clear all Database Entries  
9   Quit 
" 
 
# Define SQLite DB 
 
SQLite_DB="/home/assers/VirtualBox_Clients.db" 
 
while true; do 
  clear 
  echo -e "VirtualBox ACL Administration Module" 
  echo -e 
"=================================================" 
  echo "$MENU" 
  echo -n "Please choose one of the above options: " 
  read INPUT # Read user input and assign it to variable 
INPUT 
 
  case $INPUT in 
    1) 
    echo -e 
    sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "select * from Clients" 
    echo -e 
    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;; 
    2) 
    echo -n "Please enter full path and file name to 
export to :"  
    read CSVPath    #Read csv file path from user and 
assign it to variable CSVPath 
    sqlite3 -header -csv $SQLite_DB "select * from 
Clients;" > "$CSVPath" 
    echo -e "Clients Database exported to '$CSVPath'" 
    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;; 
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    3) 
    echo -n "Please choose an existing VM Name from 
Database to assign Client to :" 
    read VMName #Read existing VM Name from user and add 
it to variable VMName 
    VMExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 
FROM Clients WHERE VM_Name='$VMName' LIMIT 1)") 
    if [[ $VMExist > 0 ]] ; then 
        echo -n "Please enter New Client Name :"  
        read ClientName    #Read new Client Name from 
user and add it to DB 
        Client_newExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT 
EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM Clients WHERE VM_Name='$VMName' AND 
Client_Name='$ClientName' LIMIT 1)") 
        if [[ $Client_newExist > 0 ]] ; then 
           echo -e "Client '$ClientName' already exists 
for VM '$VMName'...Aborting!!" 
        else 
          echo -n "Please enter full path to the TPM EK 
file for new Client :" 
          read EKPath #Read Full path for TPM EK file 
from user and add it to variable EKPath 
   if [ -f $EKPath ] ; then   
           EKData=$(sed -n '10,17p' "$EKPath") #Read the 
full EK File for the client, extract the public key and 
assign it to variable EKData 
           UUID=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "select UUID from 
Clients where VM_Name='$VMName' LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0") 
           sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "insert into 
Clients(VM_Name,UUID,Client_Name,EK) 
values('$VMName','$UUID','$ClientName','$EKData')" 
           echo -e "New Client '$ClientName' with TPM EK 
file '$EKPath' added to Access list for VM '$VMName'" 
   else 
    echo -e "TPM EK file '$EKPath'does not exist, 
please enter a valid path!" 
   fi           
 fi       
    else 
        echo -e "The VM '$VMName' does not exist in the 
Clients Database, please make sure that it's created 
first in VirtualBox before adding clients to its Access 
List....Aborting!!" 
    fi 
    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;; 
    4) 
    echo -n "Please enter Client Name to Modify :" 
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    read ClientName_old #Read existing Client Name from 
user and add it to variable ClientName_old 
    ClientExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT 
EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM Clients WHERE 
Client_Name='$ClientName_old' LIMIT 1)") 
    if [[ $ClientExist > 0 ]] ; then 
       echo -n "Please enter the new Client Name :" 
       read ClientName_new #Read new Client Name from 
user and add it to variable ClientName_new 
       NewClientExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT 
EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM Clients WHERE 
Client_Name='$ClientName_new' LIMIT 1)") 
       if [[ $NewClientExist > 0 ]] ; then 
          echo -e "The Client '$ClientName_new' already 
exist in the Clients Database....Aborting!!" 
       else 
          sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "update Clients SET 
Client_Name=('$ClientName_new') WHERE 
Client_Name=('$ClientName_old')" 
          echo -e "All entries for Client 
'$ClientName_old' changed successfully to 
'$ClientName_new'" 
       fi 
    else 
        echo -e "The Client '$ClientName_old' does not 
exist in the Clients Database....Aborting!!" 
    fi 
    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;; 
    5) 
    echo -n "Please enter Client Name to Modify :" 
    read ClientName_old #Read existing Client Name from 
user and add it to variable ClientName_old 
    ClientExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT 
EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM Clients WHERE 
Client_Name='$ClientName_old' LIMIT 1)") 
    if [[ $ClientExist > 0 ]] ; then 
       echo -n "Please enter full path to the TPM EK file 
:" 
       read EKPath_new #Read Full path for TPM EK file 
from user and add it to variable EKPath_new 
       if [ -f $EKPath_new ] ; then 
        EKData_new=$(sed -n '10,17p' "$EKPath_new") #Read 
TPM EK File and assign it to variable EKData_new 
        sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "update Clients set 
EK=('$EKData_new') Where Client_Name='$ClientName_old'" 
        echo -e "New TPM EK for '$ClientName_old' added 
to all Entries in the Database" 
       else 
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 echo -e "TPM EK file '$EKPath_new'does not exist, 
please enter a valid path!" 
       fi  
    else 
        echo -e "The Client '$ClientName_old' does not 
exist in the Clients Database....Aborting!!" 
    fi 
    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;;  
    6) 
    echo -n "Please enter the Client Name to Delete :" 
    read ClientNameDel #Read new Client Name from user 
and add it to variable ClientName 
    DelClientExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT 
EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM Clients WHERE 
Client_Name='$ClientNameDel' LIMIT 1)") 
    if [[ $DelClientExist > 0 ]] ; then 
       echo -n "Please choose an existing VM Name from 
Database to Modify :" 
       read VMName #Read existing VM Name from user and 
add it to variable VMName 
       VMExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 
1 FROM Clients WHERE VM_Name='$VMName' LIMIT 1)") 
       if [[ $VMExist > 0 ]] ; then 
          echo -n "This will delete Client 
'$ClientNameDel' from ACL of VM '$VMName', Are you sure 
you want to continue? [Y/N]:" 
          read -n 1 REPLY 
          if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]] 
             then 
             sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "Delete FROM Clients 
WHERE Client_Name=('$ClientNameDel') AND 
VM_Name='$VMName'" 
             echo -e 
             echo -e "Entry for '$ClientNameDel' deleted 
successfully" 
             echo -e 
          else 
             echo -e       
             echo -e "Aborting..!!" 
          fi      
       else 
          echo -e "The VM '$VMName' does not exist in the 
Clients Database....Aborting!!" 
       fi     
    else 
       echo -e "The Client '$ClientNameDel' does not 
exist in the Clients Database....Aborting!!" 
    fi 
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    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;; 
    7) 
    echo -n "Please enter the Client Name to Delete :" 
    read ClientNameDel #Read new Client Name from user 
and add it to variable ClientName 
    DelClientExist=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT 
EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM Clients WHERE 
Client_Name='$ClientNameDel' LIMIT 1)") 
    if [[ $DelClientExist > 0 ]] ; then 
       echo -n "This will delete all entries for this 
Client in the Database, Are you sure you want to 
continue? [Y/N]:" 
       read -n 1 REPLY 
       if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]] 
          then 
          sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "Delete FROM Clients WHERE 
Client_Name=('$ClientNameDel')" 
          echo -e 
          echo -e "All entries for Client 
'$ClientNameDel' deleted successfully" 
          echo -e 
       else 
          echo -e       
          echo -e "Aborting..!!" 
       fi    
    else 
       echo -e "The Client '$ClientNameDel' does not 
exist in the Clients Database....Aborting!!" 
    fi 
    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;; 
    8) 
    ClearDB=$(sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 
FROM Clients LIMIT 1)") 
    if [[ $ClearDB > 0 ]]; then 
       echo -n "This will delete all entries from Clients 
Database, Are you sure you want to continue? [Y/N]:" 
       read -n 1 REPLY 
       if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]] 
       then 
           sqlite3 $SQLite_DB "DELETE FROM Clients" 
           echo -e 
           echo -e "Clients Database cleared, please add 
VM's from VirtualBox !!" 
           echo -e 
           break 
       else 
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           echo -e       
           echo "Aborting..!!" 
       fi  
    else 
       echo -e "Clients Database is already empty, please 
add VM's from VirtualBox.....Aborting!!" 
       break 
    fi 
    echo press ENTER to continue 
    read 
    ;; 
    9|q|Q) # If user presses 7, q or Q we terminate 
    exit 0 
    ;; 
    *) # All other user input results in an usage message 
    #clear 
    echo -e 
    echo Please choose alternatves 1-7 
    sleep 2 
    ;; 
  esac 
 
done 
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APPENDIX B – rDesktop.c 
--- ./orig_files/rdesktop.c 2014-06-08 
19:57:59.585251791 +0200 
+++ ./modified_files/rdesktop.c 2014-06-08 
20:03:58.021242809 +0200 
@@ -50,10 +50,13 @@ 
  
 #include "ssl.h" 
  
+//Asser Include Lines 
+#include <stdlib.h> 
+ 
 #define RDESKTOP_LICENSE_STORE 
"/.local/share/rdesktop/licenses" 
  
 uint8 g_static_rdesktop_salt_16[16] = { 
- 0xb8, 0x82, 0x29, 0x31, 0xc5, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x44,  
+ 0xb8, 0x82, 0x29, 0x31, 0xc5, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x44, 
  0x54, 0x15, 0x5e, 0x14, 0x71, 0x38, 0xd5, 0x4d 
 }; 
  
@@ -147,7 +150,9 @@ 
   "Version " PACKAGE_VERSION ". Copyright (C) 
1999-2011 Matthew Chapman et al.\n"); 
  fprintf(stderr, "See http://www.rdesktop.org/ for 
more information.\n\n"); 
  
- fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] 
server[:port]\n", program); 
+ //Asser - Modified rDesktop Usage Notes 
+ fprintf(stderr, "rDesktop with TPM Support Usage: %s 
-u USERNAME -p - [Any other options] -w 
server[:VRDP_Port]\n", program); 
+ fprintf(stderr, "rDesktop Usage: %s [options] 
server[:port]\n", program); 
 #ifdef RDP2VNC 
  fprintf(stderr, "   -V: vnc port\n"); 
  fprintf(stderr, "   -Q: defer time (ms)\n"); 
@@ -460,6 +465,16 @@ 
 main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
 { 
  char server[64]; 
+ 
+    //Asser - Variables 
+    char server_copy[64]; 
+ char scp_command[512]; 
+ char tpm_command[512]; 
+    char rm_command[512]; 
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+    char *absServer; 
+    int tpm_return_val; 
+    int scp_return_val; 
+ 
  char fullhostname[64]; 
  char domain[256]; 
  char password[64]; 
@@ -509,7 +524,7 @@ 
 #endif 
  
  while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, 
-      VNCOPT 
"Au:L:d:s:c:p:n:k:g:fbBeEmzCDKS:T:NX:a:x:Pr:045h?")) != -
1) 
+      VNCOPT 
"Au:L:d:s:c:p:n:k:g:fbBeEmzCDKS:T:NX:a:x:Pr:045wh?")) != 
-1) 
  { 
   switch (c) 
   { 
@@ -845,6 +860,50 @@ 
     g_use_rdp5 = True; 
     break; 
  
+//Asser - Main lines 
+   case 'w': 
+                
sprintf(tpm_command,"/usr/sbin/tpm_getpubek > 
~/Long_TPM_PubEK.`hostname`.%s;echo $?",g_username); 
+                FILE* pipe = popen(tpm_command, "r"); 
+                if(pipe) 
+                { 
+                    fscanf(pipe,"%d",&tpm_return_val); 
+                } 
+                pclose(pipe); 
+                if (tpm_return_val == 0) 
+                { 
+                    fprintf(stderr, "\nTPM Public EK 
generated and will be sent to remote server!\n\n"); 
+                    STRNCPY(server, argv[optind], 
sizeof(server)); 
+                    STRNCPY(server_copy, server, 
sizeof(server)); 
+                    absServer=strtok(server_copy,":"); 
+                    sprintf(scp_command,"sed -n '10,17p' 
~/Long_TPM_PubEK.`hostname`.%s > 
~/TPM_PubEK.`hostname`.%s;scp ~/TPM_PubEK.`hostname`.%s 
%s@%s:/tmp;echo 
$?",g_username,g_username,g_username,g_username,absServer
); 
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+                    FILE* pipe = popen(scp_command, 
"r"); 
+                    if(pipe) 
+                    { 
+                        
fscanf(pipe,"%d",&scp_return_val); 
+                    } 
+                    pclose(pipe); 
+                    if (scp_return_val == 0) 
+                    { 
+                        fprintf(stderr, "\nTPM Public EK 
sent to remote server and will be deleted from local 
machine!\n\n"); 
+                        sprintf(rm_command,"rm 
~/*TPM_PubEK.`hostname`.%s",g_username); 
+                        system((char*)rm_command); 
+                    } 
+                    else 
+                    { 
+                        fprintf(stderr, "\nTPM Public EK 
was not sent to remote server, please make sure that your 
client and the server host are both running openSSH and 
that your account have the required access to perform 
secure file copy to the server host!\n\n"); 
+                        fprintf(stderr,"\nDeleting local 
copy of the generated TPM Public EK & exiting!\n\n"); 
+                        sprintf(rm_command,"rm 
~/*TPM_PubEK.`hostname`.%s",g_username); 
+                        system((char*)rm_command); 
+                        exit(1); 
+                    } 
+                } 
+                else 
+                { 
+                    fprintf(stderr, "\nTPM Public EK 
generation failed, please make sure that you are running 
from a machine with a TPM that is activated and you have 
the TPM owner password...exiting!\n\n"); 
+                    exit(2); 
+                } 
+                break; 
+ 
    case 'h': 
    case '?': 
    default: 
@@ -860,6 +919,7 @@ 
  } 
  
  STRNCPY(server, argv[optind], sizeof(server)); 
+ 
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  parse_server_and_port(server); 
  
  if (g_seamless_rdp) 
@@ -1006,7 +1066,7 @@ 
   if (!rdp_connect(server, flags, domain, 
password, shell, directory, g_redirect)) 
    return EX_PROTOCOL; 
  
-  /* By setting encryption to False here, we have 
an encrypted login  
+  /* By setting encryption to False here, we have 
an encrypted login 
      packet but unencrypted transfer of other 
packets */ 
   if (!g_packet_encryption) 
    g_encryption = False; 
@@ -1501,7 +1561,7 @@ 
  return ret; 
 } 
  
-static int  
+static int 
 safe_mkdir(const char *path, int mask) 
 { 
  int res = 0; 
@@ -1520,7 +1580,7 @@ 
  return 0; 
 } 
  
-static int  
+static int 
 mkdir_p(const char *path, int mask) 
 { 
  int res; 
@@ -1538,11 +1598,11 @@ 
   errno = E2BIG; 
   return -1; 
  } 
-  
- res = 0;  
+ 
+ res = 0; 
  pt[0] = bp[0] = '\0'; 
  strcpy(bp, path); 
-  
+ 
  ptok = strtok(bp, "/"); 
  if (ptok == NULL) 
   return safe_mkdir(path,mask); 
@@ -1551,14 +1611,14 @@ 
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  { 
   if (ptok != bp) 
    strcat(pt, "/"); 
-   
-  strcat(pt, ptok);   
+ 
+  strcat(pt, ptok); 
   res = safe_mkdir(pt, mask); 
   if (res != 0) 
    return res; 
-   
+ 
  } while ((ptok = strtok(NULL, "/")) != NULL); 
-   
+ 
  return 0; 
 } 
  
@@ -1578,7 +1638,7 @@ 
  sec_hash_sha1_16(ho, hi, g_static_rdesktop_salt_16); 
  sec_hash_to_string(hash, 40, ho, 22); 
  
- snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, 
"%s"RDESKTOP_LICENSE_STORE"/%s.cal",  
+ snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, 
"%s"RDESKTOP_LICENSE_STORE"/%s.cal", 
    home, hash); 
  path[sizeof(path)-1] = '\0'; 
  
@@ -1586,7 +1646,7 @@ 
  if (fd == -1) 
  { 
   /* fallback to try reading old license file */ 
-  snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, 
"%s/.rdesktop/license.%s",  
+  snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, 
"%s/.rdesktop/license.%s", 
     home, g_hostname); 
   path[sizeof(path)-1] = '\0'; 
   if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) 
@@ -1628,9 +1688,9 @@ 
  sec_hash_sha1_16(ho, hi, g_static_rdesktop_salt_16); 
  sec_hash_to_string(hash, 40, ho, 20); 
  
- /* write licence to {sha1}.cal.new, then atomically  
+ /* write licence to {sha1}.cal.new, then atomically 
     rename to {sha1}.cal */ 
- snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, 
"%s"RDESKTOP_LICENSE_STORE"/%s.cal",  
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+ snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, 
"%s"RDESKTOP_LICENSE_STORE"/%s.cal", 
    home, hash); 
  path[sizeof(path)-1] = '\0'; 
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APPENDIX C – VirtualBoxImpl.cpp 
--- ./orig_files/VirtualBoxImpl.cpp 2014-06-08 
19:55:57.901254840 +0200 
+++ ./modified_files/VirtualBoxImpl.cpp 2014-06-08 
20:05:08.629241039 +0200 
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ 
 #include <iprt/uuid.h> 
 #include <iprt/cpp/xml.h> 
  
+#include <stdio.h> 
+ 
 #include <VBox/com/com.h> 
 #include <VBox/com/array.h> 
 #include "VBox/com/EventQueue.h" 
@@ -90,6 +92,7 @@ 
 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/////////////////////// 
  
 #define VBOX_GLOBAL_SETTINGS_FILE "VirtualBox.xml" 
+#define VM_CLIENTS_DB 
"/home/assers/VirtualBox_Clients.db" /* Path to Clients 
Database for TPM Authentication*/ 
  
 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/////////////////////// 
 // 
@@ -1775,6 +1778,16 @@ 
     if (SUCCEEDED(rc)) 
         onMachineRegistered(pMachine->getId(), TRUE); 
  
+    //Asser - Create DB & Table Lines 
+    char sqlite_create[512]; 
+    char sqlite_insert[512]; 
+ 
+    sprintf(sqlite_create,"sqlite3 %s \"CREATE TABLE IF 
NOT EXISTS Clients (ID integer primary key,VM_Name 
text,UUID integer,Client_Name text,EK 
text)\"",VM_CLIENTS_DB); 
+    system((char*)sqlite_create); 
+ 
+    sprintf(sqlite_insert,"sqlite3 %s \"insert into 
Clients (VM_Name,UUID) values 
('%s','%s')\"",VM_CLIENTS_DB,pMachine-
>getName().c_str(),pMachine-
>getId().toStringCurly().c_str()); 
+    system((char*)sqlite_insert); 
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+ 
     return rc; 
 } 
  
@@ -4605,6 +4618,12 @@ 
     // remove from the collection of registered machines 
     AutoWriteLock alock(this COMMA_LOCKVAL_SRC_POS); 
     m->allMachines.removeChild(pMachine); 
+ 
+    //Asser - Delete VM Lines 
+    char sqlite_del[512]; 
+    sprintf(sqlite_del,"sqlite3 %s \"DELETE FROM Clients 
WHERE VM_Name = ('%s')\"",VM_CLIENTS_DB,pMachine-
>getName().c_str()); 
+    system((char*)sqlite_del); 
+ 
     // save the global registry 
     HRESULT rc = saveSettings(); 
     alock.release(); 
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APPENDIX D – VBoxAuthPAM.c 
 
--- ./orig_files/VBoxAuthPAM.c 2014-06-08 
19:56:31.633253995 +0200 
+++ ./modified_files/VBoxAuthPAM.c 2014-06-08 
20:08:41.453235706 +0200 
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ 
  */ 
 #define VBOX_AUTH_USE_PAM_DLLOAD 
  
+#define VM_CLIENTS_DB 
"/home/assers/VirtualBox_Clients.db" /* Path to Clients 
Database for TPM Authentication*/ 
  
 #ifdef VBOX_AUTH_USE_PAM_DLLOAD 
 /* The name of the PAM library */ 
@@ -69,6 +70,10 @@ 
 # endif 
 #endif /* VBOX_AUTH_USE_PAM_DLLOAD */ 
  
+//Asser - Include Lines 
+#include <iprt/cdefs.h> 
+#include <iprt/uuid.h> 
+#include <iprt/sha.h> 
  
 #include <stdio.h> 
 #include <stdlib.h> 
@@ -342,6 +347,36 @@ 
     pam_conversation.conv        = conv; 
     pam_conversation.appdata_ptr = &ctx; 
  
+    //Asser - Main Lines 
+ 
+    //Get VM UUID 
+ 
+    char uuid[RTUUID_STR_LENGTH] = {0}; 
+    if (pUuid) 
+        RTUuidToStr((PCRTUUID)pUuid, (char*)uuid, 
RTUUID_STR_LENGTH); 
+        debug_printf("Connecting to VM with UUID: %s and 
using UserName: %s\n",uuid,szUser); 
+ 
+    char command[512]; 
+    char rm_command[512]; 
+    int sql_result; 
+ 
+    debug_printf("TPM Authentication start\n"); 
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+    sprintf(command,"sqlite3 %s \"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 
FROM Clients WHERE UUID='{%s}' AND (Client_Name='`ls 
/tmp/*.%s | awk -F '[._]' '{print $3}'`' AND EK='`cat 
/tmp/*.%s`') LIMIT 1)\";echo 
$?",VM_CLIENTS_DB,uuid,szUser,szUser); 
+    FILE* pipe = popen(command, "r"); 
+    if(pipe) 
+    { 
+        fscanf(pipe,"%d",&sql_result); 
+        debug_printf("Sqlite3 return value is 
%d\n",sql_result); 
+    } 
+    pclose(pipe); 
+ 
+ // check if the return valule of the sqlilte3 select 
exists command is 1 (Successfull matching in the DB) 
+ if (sql_result == 1) 
+ { 
+    debug_printf("TPM Authentication completed 
successfully, deleting received TPM EK.\n"); 
+    sprintf(rm_command,"rm /tmp/TPM*.%s",szUser); 
+    system((char*)rm_command); 
+ 
     rc = auth_pam_init (); 
  
     if (rc == PAM_SUCCESS) 
@@ -401,6 +436,13 @@ 
         debug_printf("auth_pam_init failed %d\n", rc); 
     } 
  
+ } 
+ else 
+ { 
+    debug_printf("TPM Authentication Failed, deleting 
received TPM EK.\n"); 
+    sprintf(rm_command,"rm /tmp/TPM*.%s",szUser); 
+    system((char*)rm_command); 
+ } 
     return result; 
 } 
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APPENDIX E – VBoxAuthSimple.cpp 
--- ./orig_files/VBoxAuthSimple.cpp 2014-06-08 
19:56:49.273253553 +0200 
+++ ./modified_files/VBoxAuthSimple.cpp 2014-06-08 
20:09:17.085234813 +0200 
@@ -35,7 +35,9 @@ 
  
 /* If defined, debug messages will be written to the 
specified file. */ 
 //#define AUTH_DEBUG_FILE_NAME "/tmp/VBoxAuth.log" 
+#define AUTH_DEBUG_FILE_NAME 
"/home/assers/VBoxAuthSimple.log" 
  
+#define VM_CLIENTS_DB 
"/home/assers/VirtualBox_Clients.db" /* Path to Clients 
Database for TPM Authentication*/ 
  
 static void dprintf(const char *fmt, ...) 
 { 
@@ -90,6 +92,28 @@ 
  
     dprintf("VBoxAuth: uuid: %s, user: %s, szPassword: 
%s\n", uuid, user, szPassword); 
  
+    //Asser - Main Lines 
+    char command[512]; 
+    char rm_command[512]; 
+    int sql_result; 
+ 
+    dprintf("TPM Authentication start\n"); 
+    sprintf(command,"sqlite3 %s \"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 
FROM Clients WHERE UUID='{%s}' AND (Client_Name='`ls 
/tmp/*.%s | awk -F '[._]' '{print $3}'`' AND EK='`cat 
/tmp/*.%s`') LIMIT 1)\";echo 
$?",VM_CLIENTS_DB,uuid,szUser,szUser); 
+    FILE* pipe = popen(command, "r"); 
+    if(pipe) 
+    { 
+        fscanf(pipe,"%d",&sql_result); 
+        dprintf("Sqlite3 return value is 
%d\n",sql_result); 
+    } 
+    pclose(pipe); 
+ 
+ // check if the return valule of the sqlilte3 select 
exists command is 1 (Successfull matching in the DB) 
+ if (sql_result == 1) 
+{ 
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+    dprintf("TPM Authentication completed successfully, 
deleting received TPM EK.\n"); 
+    sprintf(rm_command,"rm /tmp/TPM*.%s",szUser); 
+    system((char*)rm_command); 
+ 
     ComPtr<IVirtualBox> virtualBox; 
     HRESULT rc; 
  
@@ -119,12 +143,24 @@ 
             RTSha256ToString(abDigest, pszDigest, 
sizeof(pszDigest)); 
  
             if (password == pszDigest) 
-                result = AuthResultAccessGranted; 
+                { 
+                    result = AuthResultAccessGranted; 
+                    dprintf("Authentication completed 
successfully, Access Granted.\n"); 
+                } else 
+                    dprintf("Authentication Failed, 
Access Denied.\n"); 
         } 
     } 
  
     return result; 
 } 
+ 
+else 
+ { 
+    dprintf("TPM Authentication Failed, deleting 
received TPM EK.\n"); 
+    sprintf(rm_command,"rm /tmp/TPM*.%s",szUser); 
+    system((char*)rm_command); 
+ } 
+} 
 RT_C_DECLS_END 
  
 /* Verify the function prototype. */ 
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APPENDIX F – Test Results 
 
Table 11 Test Results for 10 Runs 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
1 1.348 1 0.878 1 0.305 1 0.296 
2 0.891 2 0.755 2 0.223 2 0.156 
3 0.884 3 1.243 3 0.162 3 0.226 
4 0.949 4 1.239 4 0.263 4 0.264 
5 1.015 5 1.229 5 0.167 5 0.203 
6 0.904 6 1.093 6 0.217 6 0.162 
7 0.88 7 1.064 7 0.157 7 0.253 
8 0.86 8 1.251 8 0.208 8 0.207 
9 1.007 9 0.904 9 0.184 9 0.164 
10 1.08 10 0.802 10 0.18 10 0.304 
Avg. 0.98 Avg. 1.05 Avg. 0.21 Avg. 0.22 
 
Table 12 Test Results for 30 Runs 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
1 1.145 1 1.254 1 0.249 1 0.266 
2 0.866 2 0.97 2 0.243 2 0.106 
3 0.964 3 0.898 3 0.176 3 0.2 
4 0.951 4 0.786 4 0.194 4 0.206 
5 1.208 5 0.767 5 0.203 5 0.247 
6 0.809 6 0.901 6 0.231 6 0.21 
7 0.879 7 0.801 7 0.157 7 0.193 
8 0.858 8 0.94 8 0.208 8 0.154 
9 1.008 9 0.836 9 0.358 9 0.286 
10 1.079 10 0.819 10 0.226 10 0.219 
11 1.156 11 0.793 11 0.192 11 0.254 
12 1.24 12 0.774 12 0.174 12 0.146 
13 1.102 13 0.909 13 0.226 13 0.355 
14 1.295 14 0.808 14 0.236 14 0.167 
15 1.151 15 0.787 15 0.253 15 0.223 
16 0.911 16 0.925 16 0.144 16 0.206 
17 0.809 17 0.822 17 0.261 17 0.335 
18 1.062 18 0.802 18 0.172 18 0.256 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
19 0.944 19 0.78 19 0.193 19 0.262 
20 0.922 20 0.762 20 0.19 20 0.165 
21 0.898 21 0.894 21 0.151 21 0.282 
22 0.874 22 0.959 22 0.13 22 0.235 
23 0.851 23 0.852 23 0.172 23 0.226 
24 1 24 0.831 24 0.216 24 0.371 
25 0.89 25 0.974 25 0.179 25 0.285 
26 0.866 26 0.868 26 0.174 26 0.177 
27 1.017 27 0.845 27 0.17 27 0.246 
28 1.519 28 0.822 28 0.134 28 0.177 
29 1.173 29 0.967 29 0.175 29 0.167 
30 1.14 30 0.859 30 0.159 30 0.296 
Avg. 1.02 Avg. 0.87 Avg. 0.20 Avg. 0.23 
 
Table 13 Test Results for 50 Runs 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
1 2.375 1 0.718 1 0.286 1 0.222 
2 0.897 2 0.827 2 0.266 2 0.262 
3 0.976 3 0.791 3 0.19 3 0.231 
4 0.952 4 0.932 4 0.172 4 0.23 
5 0.926 5 0.926 5 0.168 5 0.293 
6 0.904 6 0.822 6 0.164 6 0.344 
7 0.885 7 0.966 7 0.193 7 0.144 
8 0.858 8 0.858 8 0.207 8 0.253 
9 0.834 9 0.837 9 0.221 9 0.181 
10 0.813 10 0.982 10 0.161 10 0.164 
11 0.793 11 0.874 11 0.292 11 0.342 
12 0.773 12 0.851 12 0.184 12 0.202 
13 0.911 13 0.83 13 0.2 13 0.232 
14 0.973 14 0.975 14 0.252 14 0.306 
15 0.866 15 0.867 15 0.21 15 0.266 
16 1.016 16 0.844 16 0.167 16 0.297 
17 0.904 17 0.822 17 0.151 17 0.265 
18 1.061 18 0.802 18 0.131 18 0.169 
19 0.944 19 0.939 19 0.172 19 0.169 
20 0.92 20 0.837 20 0.184 20 0.222 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
21 0.897 21 0.815 21 0.163 21 0.21 
22 0.873 22 0.796 22 0.194 22 0.193 
23 0.852 23 0.934 23 0.213 23 0.271 
24 0.833 24 0.831 24 0.183 24 0.141 
25 0.807 25 0.809 25 0.177 25 0.151 
26 0.949 26 0.789 26 0.177 26 0.23 
27 0.843 27 0.924 27 0.138 27 0.223 
28 0.822 28 0.822 28 0.217 28 0.21 
29 0.968 29 0.802 29 0.145 29 0.162 
30 0.86 30 0.942 30 0.211 30 0.173 
31 0.838 31 1.013 31 0.203 31 0.172 
32 0.815 32 0.897 32 0.18 32 0.105 
33 0.795 33 0.874 33 0.142 33 0.135 
34 0.934 34 0.852 34 0.189 34 0.196 
35 0.831 35 0.832 35 0.204 35 0.183 
36 0.809 36 0.98 36 0.178 36 0.195 
37 0.787 37 0.868 37 0.177 37 0.247 
38 0.926 38 0.843 38 0.204 38 0.1 
39 0.99 39 0.822 39 0.155 39 0.25 
40 0.881 40 0.802 40 0.164 40 0.198 
41 0.859 41 0.78 41 0.157 41 0.156 
42 0.838 42 0.763 42 0.221 42 0.245 
43 0.983 43 0.894 43 0.219 43 0.197 
44 1.054 44 0.795 44 0.164 44 0.191 
45 0.761 45 0.934 45 0.171 45 0.121 
46 0.831 46 0.832 46 0.238 46 0.183 
47 0.809 47 0.809 47 0.196 47 0.197 
48 0.949 48 0.788 48 0.194 48 0.173 
49 0.845 49 0.926 49 0.226 49 0.17 
50 0.824 50 0.823 50 0.164 50 0.118 
Avg. 0.91 Avg. 0.86 Avg. 0.19 Avg. 0.21 
 
Table 14 Test Results for 70 Runs 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
1 1.248 1 1.131 1 0.22 1 0.258 
2 0.812 2 0.865 2 0.226 2 0.271 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
3 0.805 3 0.959 3 0.179 3 0.213 
4 0.862 4 0.948 4 0.158 4 0.191 
5 0.924 5 0.844 5 0.186 5 0.265 
6 0.993 6 0.99 6 0.167 6 0.141 
7 0.881 7 0.881 7 0.203 7 0.178 
8 0.859 8 0.858 8 0.171 8 0.189 
9 0.836 9 0.838 9 0.207 9 0.206 
10 0.983 10 0.983 10 0.216 10 0.217 
11 0.874 11 0.875 11 0.192 11 0.232 
12 0.851 12 0.851 12 0.152 12 0.248 
13 0.828 13 0.83 13 0.236 13 0.11 
14 0.808 14 0.809 14 0.243 14 0.273 
15 0.949 15 0.949 15 0.208 15 0.25 
16 0.843 16 0.845 16 0.167 16 0.109 
17 0.821 17 0.822 17 0.146 17 0.165 
18 0.969 18 0.802 18 0.176 18 0.193 
19 0.858 19 0.78 19 0.194 19 0.14 
20 0.838 20 0.763 20 0.239 20 0.232 
21 0.983 21 0.894 21 0.197 21 0.178 
22 0.874 22 0.795 22 0.191 22 0.142 
23 1.029 23 0.773 23 0.154 23 0.191 
24 0.913 24 0.91 24 0.237 24 0.17 
25 0.888 25 0.809 25 0.2 25 0.167 
26 0.865 26 0.95 26 0.161 26 0.194 
27 0.846 27 0.846 27 0.139 27 0.114 
28 0.822 28 0.825 28 0.2 28 0.203 
29 0.966 29 0.801 29 0.196 29 0.178 
30 0.859 30 0.782 30 0.111 30 0.223 
31 0.837 31 0.918 31 0.198 31 0.119 
32 0.819 32 0.983 32 0.132 32 0.155 
33 0.795 33 0.875 33 0.184 33 0.174 
34 0.94 34 0.852 34 0.158 34 0.158 
35 0.832 35 0.83 35 0.184 35 0.22 
36 0.975 36 0.974 36 0.161 36 0.15 
37 0.867 37 0.867 37 0.19 37 0.157 
38 0.844 38 0.846 38 0.141 38 0.154 
39 0.822 39 0.824 39 0.214 39 0.135 
40 0.803 40 0.802 40 0.226 40 0.191 
41 0.782 41 0.782 41 0.191 41 0.189 
42 0.918 42 0.766 42 0.12 42 0.141 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
43 0.983 43 0.741 43 0.25 43 0.214 
44 0.874 44 0.723 44 0.232 44 0.142 
45 0.853 45 0.849 45 0.25 45 0.222 
46 0.831 46 0.756 46 0.18 46 0.148 
47 0.976 47 0.887 47 0.16 47 0.196 
48 0.868 48 0.787 48 0.184 48 0.174 
49 1.017 49 0.769 49 0.209 49 0.138 
50 1.09 50 0.902 50 0.148 50 0.151 
51 0.971 51 0.803 51 0.169 51 0.177 
52 0.946 52 0.783 52 0.19 52 0.128 
53 1.109 53 0.917 53 0.26 53 0.167 
54 0.987 54 0.984 54 0.197 54 0.178 
55 0.966 55 1.055 55 0.278 55 0.134 
56 0.937 56 1.342 56 0.184 56 0.141 
57 1.105 57 1.105 57 0.131 57 0.139 
58 0.979 58 1.076 58 0.164 58 0.135 
59 0.953 59 1.049 59 0.159 59 0.106 
60 0.929 60 1.021 60 0.259 60 0.149 
61 0.907 61 0.997 61 0.162 61 0.15 
62 0.882 62 0.79 62 0.213 62 0.161 
63 0.861 63 0.86 63 0.227 63 0.121 
64 1.01 64 0.838 64 0.164 64 0.213 
65 0.897 65 0.815 65 0.184 65 0.117 
66 0.875 66 0.796 66 0.152 66 0.131 
67 0.853 67 0.934 67 0.188 67 0.132 
68 0.832 68 0.83 68 0.203 68 0.151 
69 0.809 69 0.809 69 0.147 69 0.111 
70 0.789 70 0.951 70 0.23 70 0.171 
Avg. 0.90 Avg. 0.88 Avg. 0.19 Avg. 0.17 
 
Table 15 Test Results for 100 Runs 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
1 1.362 1 1.506 1 0.25 1 0.19 
2 0.891 2 1.15 2 0.213 2 0.189 
3 1.052 3 0.888 3 0.177 3 0.148 
4 0.865 4 0.868 4 0.235 4 0.187 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
5 0.846 5 0.842 5 0.184 5 0.154 
6 0.822 6 0.823 6 0.181 6 0.225 
7 0.966 7 0.802 7 0.142 7 0.253 
8 0.858 8 0.941 8 0.161 8 0.25 
9 1.009 9 0.836 9 0.184 9 0.143 
10 0.897 10 0.815 10 0.197 10 0.216 
11 0.874 11 0.795 11 0.251 11 0.253 
12 1.025 12 0.773 12 0.168 12 0.293 
13 1.305 13 0.754 13 0.22 13 0.241 
14 1.073 14 0.888 14 0.16 14 0.193 
15 1.046 15 0.788 15 0.174 15 0.266 
16 1.023 16 0.767 16 0.174 16 0.326 
17 1.198 17 0.901 17 0.167 17 0.264 
18 1.065 18 0.801 18 0.161 18 0.21 
19 1.253 19 0.781 19 0.197 19 0.276 
20 1.112 20 0.761 20 0.167 20 0.201 
21 0.883 21 1.063 21 0.163 21 0.263 
22 0.96 22 0.875 22 0.191 22 0.232 
23 0.937 23 0.851 23 0.206 23 0.226 
24 0.913 24 0.831 24 0.148 24 0.182 
25 0.888 25 0.81 25 0.162 25 0.195 
26 0.866 26 0.95 26 0.283 26 0.23 
27 0.845 27 0.845 27 0.259 27 0.249 
28 0.824 28 0.823 28 0.224 28 0.365 
29 0.801 29 0.803 29 0.176 29 0.405 
30 0.78 30 0.782 30 0.318 30 0.214 
31 0.917 31 0.761 31 0.349 31 0.174 
32 0.815 32 0.744 32 0.236 32 0.184 
33 0.794 33 0.722 33 0.365 33 0.128 
34 1.107 34 0.85 34 0.271 34 0.157 
35 0.914 35 0.756 35 0.325 35 0.162 
36 0.889 36 0.887 36 0.284 36 0.147 
37 0.867 37 0.788 37 0.335 37 0.116 
38 0.845 38 0.768 38 0.246 38 0.176 
39 0.823 39 0.901 39 0.319 39 0.167 
40 0.802 40 0.965 40 0.286 40 0.176 
41 0.941 41 0.859 41 0.223 41 0.175 
42 0.837 42 0.838 42 0.476 42 0.157 
43 0.818 43 0.815 43 0.283 43 0.19 
44 0.795 44 0.796 44 0.263 44 0.196 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
45 0.934 45 0.934 45 0.273 45 0.141 
46 0.833 46 1 46 0.269 46 0.184 
47 0.809 47 1.071 47 0.259 47 0.161 
48 0.788 48 0.953 48 0.164 48 0.19 
49 0.767 49 0.755 49 0.3 49 0.204 
50 0.901 50 0.826 50 0.289 50 0.148 
51 0.801 51 0.971 51 0.368 51 0.14 
52 0.781 52 0.86 52 0.246 52 0.143 
53 0.762 53 0.838 53 0.452 53 0.215 
54 0.894 54 0.817 54 0.283 54 0.197 
55 0.795 55 0.967 55 0.443 55 0.213 
56 0.935 56 0.852 56 0.177 56 0.121 
57 0.829 57 0.83 57 0.131 57 0.098 
58 0.809 58 0.977 58 0.197 58 0.177 
59 0.788 59 0.867 59 0.19 59 0.176 
60 0.925 60 1.019 60 0.158 60 0.185 
61 0.823 61 0.905 61 0.167 61 0.204 
62 0.802 62 0.882 62 0.165 62 0.144 
63 0.782 63 1.039 63 0.158 63 0.157 
64 0.917 64 0.921 64 0.153 64 0.128 
65 0.816 65 0.898 65 0.184 65 0.139 
66 0.796 66 0.877 66 0.193 66 0.235 
67 0.775 67 0.853 67 0.206 67 0.174 
68 0.756 68 0.832 68 0.19 68 0.279 
69 0.889 69 0.976 69 0.144 69 0.218 
70 0.952 70 0.868 70 0.159 70 0.135 
71 0.845 71 0.845 71 0.19 71 0.171 
72 0.822 72 0.825 72 0.138 72 0.106 
73 0.802 73 0.802 73 0.159 73 0.161 
74 0.781 74 0.782 74 0.24 74 0.242 
75 0.918 75 0.761 75 0.156 75 0.265 
76 0.819 76 0.897 76 0.2 76 0.14 
77 0.796 77 0.796 77 0.262 77 0.177 
78 0.776 78 0.934 78 0.252 78 0.171 
79 0.911 79 1.003 79 0.22 79 0.203 
80 0.809 80 0.891 80 0.216 80 0.177 
81 0.789 81 0.867 81 0.171 81 0.177 
82 0.927 82 0.845 82 0.152 82 0.108 
83 0.823 83 0.824 83 0.167 83 0.144 
84 0.802 84 0.803 84 0.196 84 0.228 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
85 0.783 85 0.943 85 0.145 85 0.174 
86 0.92 86 0.838 86 0.187 86 0.203 
87 0.984 87 0.818 87 0.165 87 0.184 
88 0.875 88 0.796 88 0.16 88 0.175 
89 0.853 89 0.776 89 0.158 89 0.213 
90 0.832 90 0.912 90 0.192 90 0.158 
91 0.809 91 0.976 91 0.168 91 0.2 
92 8.157 92 0.867 92 0.19 92 0.095 
93 0.944 93 0.847 93 0.172 93 0.184 
94 0.9 94 0.826 94 0.2 94 0.16 
95 0.84 95 0.802 95 0.191 95 0.122 
96 1.023 96 0.944 96 0.172 96 0.131 
97 0.907 97 0.838 97 0.138 97 0.187 
98 0.987 98 0.99 98 0.213 98 0.151 
99 0.962 99 0.875 99 0.176 99 0.145 
100 0.938 100 0.854 100 0.209 100 0.171 
Avg. 0.96 Avg. 0.87 Avg. 0.22 Avg. 0.19 
 
Table 16 Test Results for 200 Runs 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
1 0.774 1 0.776 1 0.258 1 0.198 
2 0.793 2 0.795 2 0.259 2 0.27 
3 0.927 3 0.791 3 0.223 3 0.203 
4 0.861 4 0.786 4 0.229 4 0.255 
5 0.766 5 0.841 5 0.204 5 0.134 
6 0.901 6 0.75 6 0.199 6 0.205 
7 0.964 7 0.879 7 0.157 7 0.215 
8 0.859 8 0.782 8 0.207 8 0.232 
9 0.837 9 0.759 9 0.186 9 0.289 
10 0.816 10 0.74 10 0.216 10 0.244 
11 1.137 11 0.877 11 0.286 11 0.195 
12 0.936 12 0.774 12 0.229 12 0.249 
13 0.912 13 0.912 13 0.141 13 0.181 
14 0.891 14 0.808 14 0.213 14 0.332 
15 0.865 15 0.95 15 0.233 15 0.429 
16 0.843 16 0.845 16 0.246 16 0.221 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
17 0.822 17 0.822 17 0.264 17 0.223 
18 0.966 18 0.802 18 0.15 18 0.119 
19 0.859 19 0.94 19 0.188 19 0.246 
20 0.838 20 0.837 20 0.16 20 0.353 
21 0.986 21 0.815 21 0.165 21 0.264 
22 0.874 22 0.795 22 0.194 22 0.166 
23 0.851 23 0.934 23 0.206 23 0.205 
24 0.829 24 0.831 24 0.148 24 0.286 
25 0.807 25 0.809 25 0.171 25 0.193 
26 0.948 26 0.787 26 0.266 26 0.174 
27 0.845 27 0.767 27 0.203 27 0.32 
28 0.823 28 0.904 28 0.168 28 0.247 
29 0.967 29 0.801 29 0.179 29 0.19 
30 0.86 30 0.78 30 0.175 30 0.217 
31 0.839 31 0.762 31 0.203 31 0.309 
32 0.815 32 0.893 32 0.182 32 0.245 
33 0.957 33 0.796 33 0.21 33 0.15 
34 0.852 34 0.775 34 0.187 34 0.226 
35 0.83 35 0.908 35 0.187 35 0.245 
36 0.809 36 0.809 36 0.15 36 0.26 
37 0.95 37 0.786 37 0.165 37 0.236 
38 0.845 38 0.926 38 0.163 38 0.224 
39 0.991 39 0.824 39 0.151 39 0.185 
40 0.881 40 0.802 40 0.208 40 0.157 
41 0.858 41 0.782 41 0.175 41 0.246 
42 1.009 42 0.917 42 0.14 42 0.13 
43 0.898 43 0.818 43 0.15 43 0.167 
44 0.874 44 0.796 44 0.176 44 0.23 
45 0.851 45 0.934 45 0.187 45 0.154 
46 0.831 46 1.002 46 0.167 46 0.167 
47 0.973 47 0.891 47 0.163 47 0.197 
48 1.044 48 0.868 48 0.265 48 0.173 
49 0.929 49 0.844 49 0.167 49 0.21 
50 0.904 50 0.824 50 0.181 50 0.183 
51 0.881 51 0.803 51 0.192 51 0.175 
52 0.859 52 0.942 52 0.171 52 0.172 
53 0.838 53 0.838 53 0.201 53 0.135 
54 0.816 54 0.985 54 0.18 54 0.213 
55 0.961 55 0.875 55 0.25 55 0.177 
56 0.852 56 1.027 56 0.25 56 0.111 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
57 0.831 57 0.923 57 0.223 57 0.197 
58 0.809 58 0.9 58 0.177 58 0.233 
59 0.787 59 0.866 59 0.232 59 0.161 
60 0.77 60 0.847 60 0.167 60 0.211 
61 0.903 61 0.993 61 0.153 61 0.148 
62 0.967 62 0.881 62 0.194 62 0.134 
63 0.861 63 0.861 63 0.185 63 0.174 
64 0.838 64 0.839 64 0.208 64 0.152 
65 0.816 65 0.817 65 0.261 65 0.213 
66 0.959 66 0.796 66 0.211 66 0.259 
67 0.853 67 0.937 67 0.249 67 0.167 
68 0.832 68 1 68 0.192 68 0.22 
69 0.809 69 0.888 69 0.16 69 0.161 
70 0.789 70 0.868 70 0.217 70 0.21 
71 0.927 71 0.845 71 0.187 71 0.187 
72 0.993 72 0.824 72 0.195 72 0.181 
73 0.883 73 0.969 73 0.213 73 0.212 
74 0.861 74 0.859 74 0.191 74 0.123 
75 1.008 75 1.009 75 0.223 75 0.285 
76 0.898 76 0.906 76 0.161 76 0.128 
77 0.875 77 1.055 77 0.21 77 0.224 
78 0.852 78 0.937 78 0.226 78 0.244 
79 0.832 79 0.914 79 0.164 79 0.129 
80 0.976 80 1.08 80 0.215 80 0.164 
81 0.868 81 1.149 81 0.161 81 0.197 
82 0.845 82 1.023 82 0.22 82 0.171 
83 0.824 83 0.996 83 0.148 83 0.199 
84 0.968 84 1.171 84 0.161 84 0.179 
85 1.037 85 1.255 85 0.157 85 0.173 
86 0.921 86 0.911 86 0.299 86 0.142 
87 0.898 87 0.803 87 0.14 87 0.217 
88 1.054 88 0.875 88 0.175 88 0.12 
89 0.939 89 0.854 89 0.141 89 0.204 
90 0.934 90 1.002 90 0.184 90 0.136 
91 0.891 91 0.891 91 0.162 91 0.213 
92 0.868 92 0.868 92 0.164 92 0.252 
93 0.847 93 0.687 93 0.302 93 0.206 
94 0.823 94 0.751 94 0.146 94 0.162 
95 0.804 95 0.881 95 0.177 95 0.177 
96 0.945 96 0.942 96 0.174 96 0.194 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
97 0.838 97 0.838 97 0.171 97 0.17 
98 0.822 98 1.373 98 0.201 98 0.167 
99 0.96 99 1.059 99 0.175 99 0.131 
100 1.028 100 1.243 100 0.336 100 0.174 
101 1.103 101 1.105 101 0.158 101 0.185 
102 1.181 102 1.078 102 0.202 102 0.169 
103 1.05 103 1.049 103 0.155 103 0.158 
104 1.024 104 1.238 104 0.205 104 0.155 
105 1.201 105 1.096 105 0.149 105 0.18 
106 0.868 106 1.068 106 0.163 106 0.195 
107 0.946 107 0.847 107 0.158 107 0.181 
108 0.921 108 0.923 108 0.157 108 0.169 
109 0.9 109 0.898 109 0.292 109 0.247 
110 0.876 110 0.875 110 0.137 110 0.125 
111 1.029 111 0.854 111 0.171 111 0.226 
112 0.915 112 0.832 112 0.201 112 0.148 
113 0.891 113 0.812 113 0.217 113 0.136 
114 0.868 114 0.789 114 0.155 114 0.174 
115 0.845 115 0.769 115 0.286 115 0.221 
116 0.994 116 0.905 116 0.225 116 0.116 
117 1.265 117 0.805 117 0.261 117 0.154 
118 1.255 118 0.944 118 0.185 118 0.117 
119 1.115 119 0.841 119 0.167 119 0.103 
120 1.309 120 0.986 120 0.181 120 0.107 
121 1.164 121 0.877 121 0.175 121 0.124 
122 1.135 122 0.854 122 0.209 122 0.184 
123 1.111 123 0.832 123 0.184 123 0.114 
124 0.877 124 0.978 124 0.154 124 0.122 
125 0.959 125 0.87 125 0.16 125 0.201 
126 0.932 126 0.845 126 0.19 126 0.155 
127 0.907 127 0.825 127 0.168 127 0.124 
128 0.885 128 0.803 128 0.194 128 0.261 
129 1.039 129 0.945 129 0.141 129 0.205 
130 0.923 130 0.842 130 0.22 130 0.118 
131 0.901 131 0.819 131 0.193 131 0.121 
132 0.876 132 0.799 132 0.177 132 0.191 
133 0.854 133 0.937 133 0.21 133 0.156 
134 0.832 134 0.832 134 0.222 134 0.255 
135 0.811 135 0.811 135 0.162 135 0.237 
136 0.953 136 0.792 136 0.141 136 0.172 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
137 0.848 137 0.928 137 0.187 137 0.154 
138 0.825 138 0.825 138 0.201 138 0.238 
139 0.969 139 0.803 139 0.15 139 0.198 
140 0.862 140 0.783 140 0.23 140 0.156 
141 1.011 141 0.763 141 0.153 141 0.202 
142 0.899 142 0.744 142 0.17 142 0.267 
143 1.056 143 0.874 143 0.23 143 0.105 
144 0.763 144 0.777 144 0.154 144 0.128 
145 0.832 145 0.913 145 0.203 145 0.167 
146 0.812 146 0.977 146 0.146 146 0.213 
147 0.791 147 0.869 147 0.165 147 0.113 
148 0.769 148 0.848 148 0.194 148 0.142 
149 0.904 149 0.826 149 0.205 149 0.12 
150 0.97 150 0.804 150 0.178 150 0.177 
151 0.864 151 0.784 151 0.174 151 0.144 
152 0.839 152 0.764 152 0.171 152 0.115 
153 0.82 153 0.902 153 0.239 153 0.151 
154 0.799 154 0.798 154 0.194 154 0.134 
155 0.942 155 0.937 155 0.154 155 0.161 
156 1.004 156 0.833 156 0.209 156 0.169 
157 0.893 157 0.979 157 0.18 157 0.151 
158 0.871 158 0.87 158 0.177 158 0.156 
159 0.848 159 0.847 159 0.243 159 0.117 
160 0.995 160 0.827 160 0.201 160 0.105 
161 0.885 161 0.969 161 0.199 161 0.159 
162 0.861 162 1.039 162 0.189 162 0.131 
163 0.842 163 0.933 163 0.152 163 0.213 
164 0.817 164 0.9 164 0.199 164 0.164 
165 0.963 165 0.878 165 0.191 165 0.133 
166 0.855 166 0.856 166 0.141 166 0.097 
167 0.833 167 0.835 167 0.218 167 0.167 
168 0.815 168 0.812 168 0.147 168 0.114 
169 0.952 169 0.792 169 0.161 169 0.125 
170 0.848 170 0.774 170 0.26 170 0.122 
171 0.827 171 0.904 171 0.2 171 0.164 
172 0.969 172 0.805 172 0.195 172 0.134 
173 0.863 173 0.944 173 0.23 173 0.162 
174 0.841 174 0.84 174 0.168 174 0.171 
175 0.819 175 0.819 175 0.219 175 0.233 
176 0.799 176 0.799 176 0.243 176 0.398 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple with 
no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
(sec) 
177 0.936 177 0.937 177 0.169 177 0.228 
178 0.832 178 0.833 178 0.233 178 0.296 
179 0.815 179 0.812 179 0.201 179 0.169 
180 0.956 180 0.793 180 0.157 180 0.417 
181 0.85 181 0.929 181 0.246 181 0.432 
182 0.828 182 0.996 182 0.163 182 0.294 
183 0.805 183 0.887 183 0.216 183 0.259 
184 0.784 184 0.863 184 0.23 184 0.279 
185 0.764 185 1.013 185 0.205 185 0.388 
186 0.904 186 0.902 186 0.199 186 0.159 
187 0.799 187 0.878 187 0.194 187 0.235 
188 0.777 188 0.857 188 0.229 188 0.186 
189 0.913 189 0.835 189 0.165 189 0.397 
190 0.812 190 0.978 190 0.181 190 0.649 
191 0.791 191 0.871 191 0.177 191 1.71 
192 0.94 192 0.848 192 0.171 192 0.361 
193 0.826 193 0.825 193 0.167 193 1.553 
194 0.805 194 0.971 194 0.164 194 0.377 
195 0.788 195 1.042 195 0.195 195 0.25 
196 0.921 196 0.751 196 0.244 196 0.235 
197 0.82 197 0.819 197 0.129 197 0.172 
198 0.799 198 0.799 198 0.231 198 0.21 
199 0.778 199 0.937 199 0.189 199 0.229 
200 0.759 200 0.834 200 0.15 200 0.185 
Avg. 0.90 Avg. 0.88 Avg. 0.19 Avg. 0.21 
 
Table 17 Test Results for 300 Runs 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
1 0.776 1 1.347 1 0.187 1 0.177 
2 0.796 2 0.901 2 0.204 2 0.194 
3 0.929 3 0.886 3 0.192 3 0.236 
4 0.861 4 0.95 4 0.19 4 0.29 
5 0.925 5 0.844 5 0.179 5 0.223 
6 0.823 6 0.992 6 0.135 6 0.265 
7 0.965 7 0.885 7 0.174 7 0.233 
8 0.86 8 1.035 8 0.157 8 0.228 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
9 1.009 9 0.919 9 0.184 9 0.185 
10 0.895 10 1.282 10 0.274 10 0.197 
11 0.873 11 1.278 11 0.215 11 0.233 
12 0.85 12 1.365 12 0.21 12 0.298 
13 0.828 13 0.986 13 0.287 13 0.243 
14 0.809 14 1.075 14 0.342 14 0.192 
15 0.787 15 0.85 15 0.284 15 0.213 
16 0.769 16 0.927 16 0.177 16 0.245 
17 0.901 17 0.904 17 0.182 17 0.14 
18 0.802 18 0.882 18 0.157 18 0.178 
19 0.781 19 1.034 19 0.141 19 0.221 
20 0.76 20 0.923 20 0.218 20 0.183 
21 1.062 21 1.081 21 0.179 21 0.18 
22 1.053 22 0.961 22 0.176 22 0.254 
23 1.129 23 0.937 23 0.205 23 0.304 
24 1.003 24 1.1 24 0.183 24 0.247 
25 0.977 25 0.979 25 0.22 25 0.191 
26 0.953 26 1.148 26 0.158 26 0.253 
27 1.118 27 1.231 27 0.138 27 0.269 
28 0.809 28 1.094 28 0.213 28 0.162 
29 0.881 29 1.072 29 0.213 29 0.195 
30 0.858 30 1.039 30 0.126 30 0.228 
31 0.838 31 1.22 31 0.184 31 0.293 
32 0.819 32 1.084 32 0.197 32 0.238 
33 0.793 33 1.273 33 0.177 33 0.24 
34 0.934 34 0.921 34 0.21 34 0.147 
35 0.831 35 1.005 35 0.219 35 0.149 
36 0.809 36 1.179 36 0.16 36 0.162 
37 0.789 37 1.263 37 0.208 37 0.13 
38 0.926 38 1.354 38 0.187 38 0.168 
39 0.993 39 1.451 39 0.193 39 0.137 
40 1.222 40 1.289 40 0.144 40 0.141 
41 1.351 41 1.022 41 0.157 41 0.157 
42 1.342 42 0.905 42 0.153 42 0.203 
43 1.194 43 0.802 43 0.154 43 0.293 
44 1.401 44 0.874 44 0.177 44 0.184 
45 1.016 45 0.852 45 0.128 45 0.095 
46 0.898 46 0.832 46 0.269 46 0.137 
47 0.977 47 0.974 47 0.158 47 0.2 
48 0.953 48 1.049 48 0.174 48 0.194 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
49 0.93 49 0.93 49 0.17 49 0.138 
50 0.904 50 0.907 50 0.135 50 0.153 
51 0.884 51 1.063 51 0.182 51 0.229 
52 0.861 52 0.946 52 0.159 52 0.249 
53 0.838 53 0.921 53 0.195 53 0.203 
54 0.815 54 0.898 54 0.233 54 0.128 
55 0.796 55 0.875 55 0.231 55 0.193 
56 0.775 56 0.852 56 0.206 56 0.172 
57 0.756 57 0.831 57 0.131 57 0.137 
58 0.886 58 0.974 58 0.276 58 0.121 
59 0.95 59 0.868 59 0.21 59 0.158 
60 0.848 60 0.845 60 0.204 60 0.169 
61 0.995 61 0.993 61 0.336 61 0.192 
62 0.882 62 0.883 62 0.213 62 0.161 
63 0.86 63 0.86 63 0.23 63 0.188 
64 0.838 64 0.838 64 0.224 64 0.217 
65 0.983 65 0.82 65 0.217 65 0.181 
66 0.875 66 0.958 66 0.173 66 0.25 
67 1.22 67 1.029 67 0.315 67 0.167 
68 0.816 68 0.914 68 0.157 68 0.22 
69 0.89 69 0.891 69 0.16 69 0.159 
70 0.868 70 0.866 70 0.174 70 0.111 
71 1.017 71 1.019 71 0.219 71 0.141 
72 0.907 72 0.906 72 0.183 72 0.166 
73 0.883 73 0.882 73 0.143 73 0.119 
74 0.86 74 0.861 74 0.2 74 0.219 
75 0.838 75 0.838 75 0.24 75 0.137 
76 0.983 76 0.986 76 0.133 76 0.181 
77 0.875 77 0.875 77 0.268 77 0.233 
78 0.854 78 0.852 78 0.171 78 0.188 
79 0.831 79 0.831 79 0.221 79 0.151 
80 0.822 80 0.809 80 0.16 80 0.105 
81 0.789 81 0.788 81 0.176 81 0.221 
82 0.927 82 0.927 82 0.172 82 0.138 
83 0.825 83 0.823 83 0.277 83 0.18 
84 0.804 84 0.804 84 0.26 84 0.143 
85 0.943 85 0.943 85 0.147 85 0.117 
86 0.838 86 0.838 86 0.185 86 0.131 
87 0.817 87 0.816 87 0.217 87 0.149 
88 0.96 88 0.796 88 0.196 88 0.132 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
89 0.855 89 0.776 89 0.19 89 0.129 
90 0.832 90 0.911 90 0.149 90 0.154 
91 0.811 91 0.976 91 0.162 91 0.194 
92 0.789 92 0.87 92 0.192 92 0.226 
93 0.77 93 1.019 93 0.206 93 0.092 
94 0.904 94 0.907 94 0.188 94 0.138 
95 0.803 95 0.882 95 0.184 95 0.108 
96 0.784 96 0.861 96 0.174 96 0.216 
97 0.763 97 0.842 97 0.203 97 0.126 
98 0.743 98 0.819 98 0.182 98 0.146 
99 0.872 99 0.965 99 0.18 99 0.165 
100 0.776 100 1.028 100 0.145 100 0.125 
101 0.911 101 0.916 101 0.185 101 0.134 
102 0.81 102 0.893 102 0.197 102 0.134 
103 0.79 103 0.868 103 0.176 103 0.077 
104 0.927 104 0.846 104 0.171 104 0.139 
105 0.826 105 0.823 105 0.202 105 0.19 
106 0.968 106 0.803 106 0.191 106 0.148 
107 0.862 107 0.943 107 0.207 107 0.174 
108 0.839 108 0.841 108 0.228 108 0.125 
109 0.985 109 0.819 109 0.164 109 0.11 
110 0.876 110 0.799 110 0.182 110 0.147 
111 0.853 111 0.934 111 0.174 111 0.131 
112 0.832 112 0.832 112 0.179 112 0.213 
113 0.812 113 0.815 113 0.162 113 0.237 
114 0.789 114 0.953 114 0.158 114 0.123 
115 0.769 115 0.848 115 0.187 115 0.204 
116 0.921 116 0.993 116 0.167 116 0.134 
117 0.805 117 0.883 117 0.162 117 0.147 
118 0.783 118 0.861 118 0.158 118 0.15 
119 0.921 119 0.841 119 0.204 119 0.2 
120 0.818 120 1 120 0.165 120 0.165 
121 0.797 121 0.876 121 0.161 121 0.161 
122 0.777 122 0.855 122 0.157 122 0.223 
123 0.911 123 0.832 123 0.125 123 0.187 
124 0.81 124 0.812 124 0.163 124 0.179 
125 0.952 125 0.791 125 0.207 125 0.111 
126 0.846 126 0.927 126 0.138 126 0.146 
127 0.993 127 0.828 127 0.233 127 0.165 
128 0.884 128 1.152 128 0.217 128 0.148 
102 
 
PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
129 0.863 129 0.947 129 0.194 129 0.178 
130 0.839 130 0.922 130 0.186 130 0.112 
131 0.819 131 0.899 131 0.147 131 0.105 
132 0.797 132 0.877 132 0.164 132 0.187 
133 0.776 133 0.855 133 0.223 133 0.173 
134 0.911 134 1.003 134 0.184 134 0.125 
135 0.812 135 1.276 135 0.187 135 0.2 
136 0.79 136 1.266 136 0.254 136 0.166 
137 0.769 137 1.126 137 0.167 137 0.127 
138 0.904 138 1.097 138 0.149 138 0.141 
139 0.805 139 1.069 139 0.233 139 0.172 
140 0.783 140 1.042 140 0.157 140 0.174 
141 0.92 141 1.016 141 0.243 141 0.154 
142 0.819 142 0.993 142 0.162 142 0.151 
143 0.798 143 0.965 143 0.144 143 0.148 
144 0.937 144 1.131 144 0.194 144 0.205 
145 0.833 145 0.819 145 0.203 145 0.185 
146 0.977 146 0.892 146 0.148 146 0.174 
147 0.87 147 0.869 147 0.197 147 0.16 
148 0.846 148 0.848 148 0.208 148 0.187 
149 0.825 149 0.995 149 0.22 149 0.169 
150 0.805 150 1.066 150 0.194 150 0.163 
151 0.944 151 0.949 151 0.193 151 0.17 
152 0.841 152 1.323 152 0.266 152 0.153 
153 0.818 153 1.311 153 0.328 153 0.255 
154 0.962 154 1.405 154 0.312 154 0.125 
155 1.032 155 1.25 155 0.223 155 0.166 
156 1.314 156 1.218 156 0.203 156 0.185 
157 1.078 157 1.187 157 0.311 157 0.182 
158 1.052 158 0.94 158 0.207 158 0.193 
159 1.024 159 0.834 159 0.23 159 0.172 
160 1.203 160 1.097 160 0.181 160 0.137 
161 0.869 161 0.792 161 0.195 161 0.15 
162 0.948 162 0.863 162 0.159 162 0.209 
163 0.923 163 1.014 163 0.244 163 0.143 
164 0.901 164 0.901 164 0.165 164 0.223 
165 0.878 165 0.876 165 0.144 165 0.256 
166 0.855 166 0.855 166 0.23 166 0.21 
167 0.834 167 0.834 167 0.191 167 0.165 
168 0.812 168 0.978 168 0.115 168 0.224 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
169 0.792 169 0.869 169 0.174 169 0.157 
170 0.93 170 0.847 170 0.223 170 0.11 
171 0.826 171 0.826 171 0.183 171 0.112 
172 0.805 172 0.805 172 0.178 172 0.148 
173 1.318 173 0.947 173 0.176 173 0.131 
174 1.225 174 1.013 174 0.116 174 0.154 
175 1.56 175 0.902 175 0.14 175 0.23 
176 2.891 176 0.878 176 0.164 176 0.178 
177 2.013 177 0.855 177 0.174 177 0.141 
178 0.96 178 1.014 178 0.22 178 0.191 
179 0.924 179 0.894 179 0.217 179 0.2 
180 0.743 180 0.87 180 0.193 180 0.211 
181 0.758 181 0.848 181 0.194 181 0.187 
182 0.825 182 0.825 182 0.148 182 0.15 
183 0.805 183 0.97 183 0.198 183 0.163 
184 0.784 184 0.865 184 0.213 184 0.131 
185 0.934 185 0.841 185 0.154 185 0.127 
186 0.819 186 0.82 186 0.165 186 0.125 
187 0.798 187 0.8 187 0.161 187 0.207 
188 0.777 188 0.937 188 0.224 188 0.193 
189 0.914 189 0.834 189 0.188 189 0.167 
190 0.812 190 0.812 190 0.22 190 0.276 
191 0.791 191 0.953 191 0.233 191 0.182 
192 0.77 192 0.849 192 0.249 192 0.188 
193 0.904 193 0.996 193 0.276 193 0.089 
194 0.805 194 0.885 194 0.305 194 0.086 
195 0.945 195 0.865 195 0.306 195 0.131 
196 0.842 196 0.843 196 0.231 196 0.123 
197 0.819 197 0.819 197 0.154 197 0.137 
198 0.799 198 0.963 198 0.338 198 0.135 
199 0.779 199 0.855 199 0.366 199 0.109 
200 0.758 200 1.005 200 0.357 200 0.151 
201 1.059 201 0.894 201 0.319 201 0.149 
202 0.869 202 0.87 202 0.207 202 0.138 
203 0.849 203 0.848 203 0.257 203 0.155 
204 0.827 204 0.827 204 0.293 204 0.166 
205 0.805 205 0.805 205 0.372 205 0.148 
206 0.786 206 0.784 206 0.249 206 0.097 
207 0.922 207 0.765 207 0.703 207 0.148 
208 0.82 208 0.9 208 0.915 208 0.181 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
209 0.8 209 0.967 209 1.305 209 0.18 
210 0.937 210 0.855 210 0.21 210 0.128 
211 0.835 211 0.835 211 0.575 211 0.121 
212 0.815 212 0.813 212 0.278 212 0.148 
213 0.792 213 0.792 213 0.496 213 0.131 
214 0.93 214 0.93 214 0.283 214 0.106 
215 0.827 215 0.827 215 0.288 215 0.167 
216 0.805 216 0.806 216 0.315 216 0.162 
217 0.788 217 0.948 217 0.306 217 0.119 
218 0.924 218 0.842 218 0.299 218 0.105 
219 0.819 219 0.988 219 0.351 219 0.164 
220 0.799 220 0.88 220 0.2 220 0.161 
221 0.938 221 0.856 221 0.177 221 0.148 
222 0.835 222 0.835 222 0.204 222 0.167 
223 0.812 223 0.813 223 0.201 223 0.182 
224 0.956 224 0.792 224 0.157 224 0.152 
225 0.849 225 0.93 225 0.213 225 0.148 
226 0.828 226 0.838 226 0.263 226 0.169 
227 0.807 227 0.972 227 0.26 227 0.097 
228 0.95 228 0.866 228 0.281 228 0.122 
229 0.842 229 0.842 229 0.206 229 0.171 
230 0.821 230 0.822 230 0.22 230 0.18 
231 0.8 231 0.962 231 0.257 231 0.149 
232 0.95 232 0.861 232 0.148 232 0.144 
233 0.838 233 1.005 233 0.231 233 0.139 
234 0.813 234 0.894 234 0.163 234 0.138 
235 0.957 235 0.873 235 0.178 235 0.134 
236 0.851 236 1.025 236 0.207 236 0.167 
237 0.999 237 0.912 237 0.184 237 0.114 
238 0.888 238 0.888 238 0.183 238 0.148 
239 0.865 239 0.865 239 0.21 239 0.135 
240 0.842 240 0.842 240 0.155 240 0.184 
241 0.82 241 0.82 241 0.2 241 0.125 
242 0.801 242 0.8 242 0.179 242 0.138 
243 0.779 243 0.78 243 0.174 243 0.157 
244 0.758 244 0.915 244 0.17 244 0.142 
245 0.891 245 0.98 245 0.164 245 0.164 
246 0.958 246 0.873 246 0.234 246 0.102 
247 0.85 247 0.852 247 0.187 247 0.143 
248 0.828 248 0.998 248 0.184 248 0.153 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
249 0.973 249 0.886 249 0.22 249 0.194 
250 0.865 250 0.865 250 0.194 250 0.159 
251 0.842 251 0.843 251 0.228 251 0.157 
252 0.821 252 0.822 252 0.207 252 0.154 
253 0.8 253 0.965 253 0.195 253 0.177 
254 0.938 254 0.858 254 0.19 254 0.131 
255 0.835 255 0.835 255 0.185 255 0.115 
256 0.813 256 0.815 256 0.17 256 0.151 
257 0.793 257 0.792 257 0.204 257 0.16 
258 0.93 258 0.773 258 0.171 258 0.142 
259 0.828 259 1.078 259 0.139 259 0.113 
260 0.805 260 0.887 260 0.179 260 0.148 
261 0.786 261 0.865 261 0.191 261 0.132 
262 0.923 262 0.842 262 0.17 262 0.133 
263 0.821 263 0.823 263 0.138 263 0.126 
264 0.801 264 0.963 264 0.249 264 0.161 
265 0.779 265 1.228 265 0.19 265 0.187 
266 0.916 266 1.224 266 0.186 266 0.1 
267 0.815 267 1.315 267 0.118 267 0.151 
268 0.793 268 1.161 268 0.148 268 0.164 
269 0.773 269 0.919 269 0.177 269 0.095 
270 0.908 270 1.001 270 0.188 270 0.139 
271 0.973 271 0.793 271 0.162 271 0.206 
272 0.866 272 0.865 272 0.163 272 0.192 
273 0.842 273 0.843 273 0.125 273 0.146 
274 0.822 274 0.822 274 0.138 274 0.126 
275 0.8 275 0.799 275 0.141 275 0.161 
276 0.94 276 0.944 276 0.16 276 0.125 
277 0.835 277 0.836 277 0.17 277 0.154 
278 0.815 278 0.816 278 0.153 278 0.113 
279 0.794 279 0.793 279 0.178 279 0.155 
280 0.932 280 0.934 280 0.157 280 0.157 
281 0.83 281 0.829 281 0.219 281 0.141 
282 0.808 282 0.808 282 0.18 282 0.164 
283 0.786 283 1.125 283 0.143 283 0.118 
284 0.924 284 1.118 284 0.189 284 0.105 
285 0.821 285 0.995 285 0.202 285 0.141 
286 0.802 286 1.167 286 0.145 286 0.122 
287 0.94 287 1.037 287 0.157 287 0.119 
288 1.018 288 1.218 288 0.144 288 0.141 
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PAM with TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with TPM 
PAM with no TPM 
VBoxAuthSimple 
with no TPM 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime  
(sec) 
Seq 
JobRuntime 
 (sec) 
289 1.078 289 1.305 289 0.164 289 0.125 
290 1.16 290 0.944 290 0.208 290 0.174 
291 1.24 291 0.837 291 0.218 291 0.172 
292 1.101 292 0.912 292 0.151 292 0.154 
293 1.075 293 0.888 293 0.169 293 0.154 
294 0.851 294 0.865 294 0.164 294 0.148 
295 0.927 295 0.843 295 0.23 295 0.145 
296 0.913 296 0.99 296 0.15 296 0.141 
297 0.88 297 0.879 297 0.195 297 0.163 
298 0.858 298 0.858 298 0.178 298 0.181 
299 0.836 299 0.838 299 0.138 299 0.126 
300 0.814 300 0.815 300 0.157 300 0.137 
Avg. 0.89 Avg. 0.94 Avg. 0.21 Avg. 0.16 
 
